

See for the reference of  
Bahadur Yar Jung on  
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12, 13, 19, 24.

# Hyderabad in Retrospect

by

AN EX-OFFICIAL OF HYDERABAD

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# Hyderabad in Retrospect



# INTRODUCTION

In response to widespread demand the composite reprint of a memorable series of articles in *The Times of India* is published. As the articles appeared at irregular intervals starting shortly after India's police action of September 1948, they have been appropriately amended by the distinguished author to read as a whole. The account given is the most coherent objective analysis yet produced of the forces and incidents which led to the Hyderabad *affaire*.

BOMBAY,  
FEBRUARY, 1949.

EDITOR,  
"THE TIMES OF INDIA."

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## I RISE OF THE ITTEHAD

IN 1926, the Paramount Power intervened to put an end to misrule and maladministration in Hyderabad. Four senior British officials took over control of the key Departments of Revenue, Police and Industries ; one of them was given a seat in the Executive Council. His Exalted Highness the Nizam could no longer set aside the unanimous recommendations of the Council and no Minister could henceforth be appointed without the approval of the British Resident.

I was a student in England and I well remember how I and others from Hyderabad, both Hindu and Muslim, reacted to these developments. We felt humiliated and we nursed a sense of anger against those in power who had abused it and brought shame upon us as well as against those who had intervened only to substitute the autocracy of the Political Department of the Government of India for the autocracy of the Nizam.

It was clear that there was no intention to democratise the State. The new arrangements left the people where they were. We, therefore, decided to organise ourselves and educate public opinion ; we formed an association of our own and, when we returned, we established it in Hyderabad under the name of the Society of Union and Progress. The moving spirits were Padmaja Naidu, Akbar Ali Khan, B. Rarakishen Rao, Baqar Ali Mirza, M. Narsing Rao, Ali Yar Khan, Madapati Ramchander Rao, M. H. Jafari and Fazlur Rahman. We signed a pledge affirming our belief in the principle of responsibility of the executive to the legislature and we excluded from membership all those who belonged to any communal organisation.

Secure in their citadels of power, the Muslims of Hyderabad had till then no politics of their own except the politics of place and the intrigues associated with it. The struggle for political rights became thus the natural monopoly of the Hindus. The leading Hindu talents, like Vaman Naik, took to public life. Muslim talents were largely found in Government service. What brought both together was the Mulki sentiment, already smarting under the yoke of non-Mulki domination and now outraged by the bureaucratic form taken by British intervention. A Mulki League sprang into being and persons like Sir Nizam Jung and even Bahadur Yar Jung agreed to subscribe to the principle of responsible government. Under non-Mulki influence, the Government of the day discouraged and opposed

the League and members even of our small Society were shadowed by the police.

The non-Mulkis were mostly Muslims from the north and they found their best security in the encouragement of a communal ideal which would bring the Muslims, Mulki and non-Mulki closer together and divide the Mulkis. The fires lighted by these outsiders were fanned by communal breezes from British India. It was thus that the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, originally a religious and cultural body, acquired a predominantly political bias, while the leading Muslim daily, the *Rahbar*, began adapting its Mulkiism to communalism of the deepest dye. It retained the former as a stick against a non-Mulki-ridden Government and adopted the latter as a weapon against the Hindus. It manœuvred for favour (and gained it) in high quarters by its invective against the shackles of Paramountcy ; it pampered the orthodox and the communalist by its claim that Hyderabad was a Muslim State. It asserted that Muslim supremacy was based upon the right of conquest.

I remember the talk which some of us had on one occasion with the late Bahadur Yar Jung who had just returned from a tour of Europe and the Middle East and had become the chief mentor of the Ittehad. He was impressed by the great democratic urges in Europe and the Muslim countries and, pointing to them, we stressed the inexpediency, even from their own point of view, of the Muslims aligning themselves against the people's movement. We suggested as an alternative that he should concentrate on the economic future of the Muslims in the sense of securing to them a place in occupations other than Government service where the balance would have to be redressed sooner or later. We urged that a common platform would keep politics above communalism. As co-workers in a common struggle for freedom, the Muslims would retain an adequate share in the future dispensation ; as antagonists, they would lose all and leave a legacy of hatred. Bahadur Yar Jung agreed generally but made one reservation which vitiated the whole conception. He said he believed that the Muslims should first organise themselves politically in order to be able to exact the best terms. Then, he said, they could join hands. He obviously ignored the reaction which any such organisation would produce on the Hindu mind and he ignored equally the world forces which were at work. We agreed to differ but he had the great gift of retaining friendships despite differences of view.

No mass movement, such as Bahadur Yar Jung was attempting to create, could for long remain purely defensive, and his own personality was too dynamic for a passive role. Soon, the progress of the movement demanded minor encounters. Made President of Council in 1937, Sir Akbar Hydari provided a

convenient target for attack while Federation lent an obvious field for the first trials of strength. Both selections were made with an eye to the fact that the highest in the land and the lowest were suspicious of Sir Akbar and apprehensive of Federation. Having thus acquired both patronage and the support of the Muslim public, Bahadur Yar Jung began to attack the source of power itself—the foreigner at the Residency who held the Nizam under tutelage and kept extremism at bay with the help of the Army stationed at Secunderabad. Even at that stage, Bahadur Yar Jung could have brought Hindus and Muslims together in a common front against Federation which, as embodied in the Act of 1935, was under fire both from the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress in British India. But common action in defence of the integrity and rights of the State postulated agreement in internal matters and Bahadur Yar Jung was not ready for that. He preferred to be a Muslim rather than a national leader.

The Government was in the unenviable position of being suspected locally of endeavouring to land the State into accession and accused by the British Government of blocking the road to Federation by harping on the rights of the State. Believing in personal equations, Sir Akbar took as his Council Secretary Khwaja Moinuddin Ansari, later known as Moin Nawaz Jung, as he was related to the *Rahbar* group and was *persona grata* with the Ittehad. A Bihar Civilian, Syed Taqiuddin, having got into hot waters with the Congress Government in that Province, had already been foisted on the Constitutional Affairs Secretariat in order to convince the Ittehad that the alleged Hindu leanings of the Secretary would be duly checked. Having thus appeased the suspicious, Sir Akbar agreed to the proposal of the Secretary that a Committee be appointed to make recommendations on the lines which constitutional reforms in the State should take. Sir Akbar was himself convinced of the necessity and soon succeeded in convincing his master.

## II

### CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

THE necessity was all the more urgent as reports were pouring in of a general dissatisfaction among the Hindus. One of the effects of **Bahadur Yar Jung's mass movement**, particularly the conversion of untouchables in certain districts, was to awaken the Hindus to a sense of danger and give a predominantly communal bias to their political struggle. A body called the Convention failed to reach an agreed solution and Abul Kalam Syed Ali was forced to withdraw his agreement at the last moment by order of his party, the Ittehad. The tension grew in spite of an edict muzzling **Bahadur Yar Jung** from public speaking, riots broke out in the city and resulted in four deaths, two Hindus and two Muslims. Parity having thus been reached in the death-roll, there was a lull for a time, but the Reform Committee raised new hopes and fears. Reform meant the sharing of power and the question naturally arose as to who should share it and in what proportion. Hindus and Muslims prepared themselves for the race and the first step was taken by the Hindus.

Encouraged by the existence of popular Government in the neighbouring Provinces, enraged by **Bahadur Yar Jung** and exasperated by Government which, while referring constitutional reforms to a Committee, had taken no immediate steps to relax the repressive laws such as the rules governing public meetings, the State Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj launched a simultaneous civil disobedience movement. The combination was unfortunate as it mixed communal aims with political aims and parties, and the State Congress withdrew shortly afterwards, as it was advised by Mahatma Gandhi not to identify itself with a communal movement. It was unfortunate that Arya propaganda was seldom either honest or true and Hindus themselves denied that they were prepared to wear white or riding on horseback.

Equally unfortunate was the fact that the Provinces made the base for the movement, for the States began to wonder what sort of bedfellows they would make in a Federation of all-India and what protection the States would receive from the Governor-General and the Governors acting in their districts. In fact, it was common knowledge that the India Office acquiesced in turning the heat on Hyderabad in order that the States generally and Hyderabad in particular should become more chastened and less treaty-conscious. But, whatever

## THE ITTEHAD'S FIRST VICTORY

mistakes and wrongs of certain acts of commission and omission, the broad fact remained that the people of the State had outgrown the walls which autocracy, tradition and vested interests had built around it. As for the communalism of the Arya Samaj, surely the Ittehad was also communal.

With 8,000 workers in jail and funds exhausted the Arya Samaj was looking for a settlement. The Government also realised that a purely repressive and negative policy would not do. The Reforms Committee had reported and Government would soon have to make some announcement. In consultation, therefore, with the leaders of the Arya Samaj, the ingenious method was devised of "explaining" in a *communiqué* the intentions underlying some of the existing laws which had caused "misunderstandings" and resulted in the Satyagraha. Other points were left to be covered by the Reforms announcement. The "explanation" afforded the opportunity and the excuse for the withdrawal of the Satyagraha and both Government and the Arya Samajists went back to their respective camps and claimed that the other had surrendered. In fact, both were tired of the struggle. Only the Ittehad emerged strong as it had kept itself in reserve except for occasional outbursts against giving Ovaltine to sick political prisoners. Itself in perfect health, it had received more than its due share of nourishment and it was rumoured that it had even obtained a subsidy. Fed by several hands, this monster of Frankenstein had developed strength within the space of ten years and had, by 1939, already come of age.

### III

## THE ITTEHAD'S FIRST VICTORY

THE proposals submitted to Government for the reform of the legislature varied slightly from the recommendations made by the Reforms Committee. Representation was to be by interests (as recommended by the majority), 50 per cent of the elected representatives were to be Hindus and the remaining 50 per cent Muslims, the electorates were to be joint and, among the nominated, there were to be two Christians and one Parsi. The non-officials, elected and nominated, were to be in a majority in the Assembly. The functional basis was chosen in the belief

that it would in time bring the economic *motif* to the forefront and override the communal factor ; at the same time, a heavy weightage of 50 per cent was given to the Muslims in recognition of their special position in the State. This obvious violence done to the mathematics of representation was set off by the condition of joint electorates, advantageous to the Hindus who were in a majority in almost every constituency. The two Christians and one Parsi were thus given a decisive position and, in order that they should be free from Hindu or Muslim bias, they were to be nominated, not elected, from a panel of names to be suggested by their respective associations. The scheme was an obvious attempt at compromise, with the lion's share of advantage going to the Muslims, but, surprisingly enough, while the expected Hindu opposition to it was mild, the Muslim reaction was violent.

**Bahadur Yar Jung's** main demands were three ; he asked that the State should be declared a Muslim State, that joint electorates should be replaced by separate electorates and that the three nominees of the Nizam from the Sarfikhah (Crown Estate) should be Muslims so as to balance the two Christians and one Parsi and thus arrive at a Muslim-non-Muslim parity. Government first refused all the three demands, then it started, under pressure, to negotiate. A formula was found for reference to Hyderabad as a " Muslim State " in a context which asserted at the same time that it was " the indivisible asset " of all its people. Joint electorates were diluted by the condition that a candidate, to be elected, must obtain at least 40 per cent of the votes cast by his own community. Beyond that the Government refused to go and maintained that the electorates must remain joint and parity must be between Hindus and Muslims, not Muslims and non-Muslims. **Bahadur Yar Jung** then threatened direct action.

It is believed that the British Resident advised the Government to go slow as the world was already in the convulsions of the second World War. Then the Nizam invited Mr. Jinnah to assist. The advocate of separate electorates in British India was not expected to support joint electorates in a " Muslim State ", but it was hoped that Mr. Jinnah would persuade his followers to drop their demand for Muslim-non-Muslim parity. Strange enough, like **Bahadur Yar Jung** who urged responsible government in Kashmir but opposed it in Hyderabad, Mr. Jinnah who was shortly to demand the partition of India on the basis of communal majorities agreed with the Ittehad that the major community in Hyderabad should be in a minority in the legislature. Having stayed two days and a night, he delivered an ultimatum and the Nizam commanded that the Council should at once **make up its mind and take the responsibility for the consequences.**

The defences of Sir Akbar's Council then find all objections to the demands were overruled.

On the third morning of Mr. Jinnah's stay he communicated in writing to the Ittehad leaders that he would appoint only Muslims to represent them and that no candidate would be declared elected until he had secured a majority within the framework of joint electorates, that is, on the basis of the votes cast by his own community. That 50 seats in the legislature would go to Muslims and the remaining 50 would be divided between Hindus and Parsis; it also meant separate electorates for Muslims. The assurance repudiated the announcement of betrayal of trust. That was why it was kept secret and thus won in the very first round.

#### IV

#### NEW NAZISM

THERE might well have been a pact between the Nizam's Government, for no one better than that Government. The war kept Federalism of consistency in abeyance and provided the Reforms which had been rendered unwelcome by the opposition between the announcement and the execution. Against these inconveniences, the Government Ally plunged headlong into the war effort and war funds. Loyalty was an old tradition being brought up to date with one eye set on the future. *but anti-fascist declarations were a decided novelty.* were the Latin quotations which emanated from the Legal Adviser's Office in the pre-war period. British Indian Ordinances to the needs of the present had to be maintained at any cost and, in the end, at the cost of law and order itself. That the Osmania University developed a sudden hatred for being caught in the travel and a sudden hatred for being caught in the travel beat up the Railway staff, wrecked a wagon, sent eight hundred strong to Sir Akbar's house, and the Director-General of Police and several others. All that Sir Akbar's kitchen and pantry

Sir Venkat Subba Rao, the Nizam's Agent at Nagpur, sat in judgment over these boisterous deeds and prescribed the punishment but the file was kept in cold storage for months lest the execution of the sentence should provoke further demonstrations. A year later, even conscience was sacrificed at the altar of peace. It was more or less promised that the ban imposed on the State Congress would be withdrawn if it changed its name which was said to bear a strange resemblance to a dangerously non-violent organisation in British India. Frustrated by inactivity, the State Congress agreed only to find that further conditions were being urged. What had happened behind the scenes was that the *Rahbar* had raised the question whether a mere change of name was sufficient to allow the preaching of heresies like responsible government, and it was well known that the *Rahbar's* opinion counted. So, fresh conditions were invented and proposed.

While the British Government was fighting the forces of Nazism in Europe, the Government of its Faithful Ally was surrendering inch after inch of ground to the new Nazism which thus arose in Hyderabad. In contrast to his brilliant achievements as Finance Minister, Sir Akbar had failed as President of Council, presumably because he was not allowed to succeed. But what ought a Minister to do when his advice is not accepted or when he is forced to accept policies diametrically opposed to his own? With all his greatness and imagination, Sir Akbar had waited a little too long.

Hyderabad's new President of Council, the Nawab of Chattari, was the blue-eyed boy of Imperial Delhi, a gentleman to the tips of his fingers with a large fund of commonsense and a genuine belief in joint electorates as he was a progressive realist among die-hards. He soon discovered, being a Hafiz of the Quran, that his co-religionists in this southern bastion of Muslim rule were repeating a new incantation, a political Kalema which asserted that the Nizam and his flag were mere symbols of Muslim sovereignty and that every Muslim was, therefore, part and parcel of the Sovereign. The doctrine had the magic of making the commoner feel he was the King even though the King himself denied it. Chattari's drive was, however, seen only on tennis courts; in administration and politics, he was a cricketer and he settled down to a policy of stonewalling.

The Government had benefited by the war; the Muslims had grown stronger and now, with the need for rationing and the system of levy of grain, the war was beginning to benefit the corrupt. But even Hitler could not have foreseen that his attack on Russia would benefit the Communists in India, and when Delhi, anxious to gain support for the war effort as a set-off against the Congress boycott, lifted the ban imposed on the Communists, Hyderabad followed suit. Throughout the

remaining period of the war the Communists consolidated their position among field and factory workers. Both had genuine grievances and Communist ideology was undeniably catching in a country where one class suffered from indigestion and the other from scarcity. There was oppression also, by the collector of the grain levy, the Police and the Deshmukh. Nalgenda was chosen as the district best suited for an agrarian movement as it claimed the worst Deshmukhs and the largest number of schools. It was also a border district with a convenient enclave of Indian territory. But the movement was too young to be noticed and the Chattari Ministry was too busy, first with the Cripps offer and later with the Cabinet Mission, to think of internal developments. The discussions opened up vast vistas of hope and Ittehad politicians demanded Berar, the Ceded Districts and the Northern Circars. No one was prepared to think of the internal problem and those who suggested that external aspirations postulated an internal settlement were put in their places.

Even progressive measures like income-tax were opposed by an alliance between the vested interests and those who controlled the strings of ultimate decision. And, all the while, the Reforms proposals were kept safely under lock and key despite note after note offering a solution of the tangle. There was logic in this inactivity, for if Sir Akbar could leave the mischief of the secret assurance to be undone by his successor, his successor could surely do likewise rather than risk a broken head. So, both the announcement and the assurance remained unimplemented and the President continued to bat for safety. When Bahadur Yar Jung died suddenly, there were some who thought that Government's task would be made easier, but this proved to be wrong. While being an extremist himself, Bahadur Yar Jung was able to control the extremism of others ; with his death, the restraining no less than the inciting influence disappeared. Abdur Rahman Rais and other extremists began to assert themselves.

One day, the volunteers of the Ittehad sacked the house of an Arab, situated within the compound of the Ittehad headquarters. But the Arabs were tough guys ; in the presence of the Police they beat up both the volunteers and the leaders. This was the first reverse suffered by the monster and he suffered it at the hands of his co-religionists. He was, however, soon able to retrieve his position. A year later, a temporary mosque in the Leper Asylum at Dichpalli was alleged to have been removed by the Mission authorities and Muslim feelings ran high. Chattari's Government procrastinated for weeks. While a settlement was being reached, an angry mob collected in the city and was addressed by several leaders, including Rais. The speeches were rabid and violent and the mob, incited to fury, marched to Shah Manzil, the official residence of the President, and set fire to it.

It then proceeded at leisure to set fire to the house of the British Police Minister. Throughout the three miles of its journey, it was unmolested by the Police. It was then that Chattari realised that he too, like Sir Akbar, should have left much earlier. The batting for safety had made no difference at all.

## V

## A SCHEMING MIND

IN 1946, the Nawab of Chattari vacated what was left of his office and the Nizam chose Sir Mirza Ismail as successor. The choice appears to have been dictated by the consideration that, in the new set-up after British withdrawal, Sir Mirza would enjoy some influence. Hyderabad Hindus welcomed the choice but the Ittehad was opposed. The choice irritated Mr. Jinnah as Sir Mirza was a staunch opponent of the Muslim League. Availing of an earlier invitation by the Nizam, Mr. Jinnah arrived as a guest of the State but found the Nizam in no mood to change his mind. In fact, he is reported to have snubbed Mr. Jinnah for sitting cross-legged before royalty and smoking a cigar, and for the unreasonableness of his opposition to the man of his choice. Mr. Jinnah left Hyderabad in a bitter mood, and it was in the same month of July, 1946, that he withdrew his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's plan. The tussle between the Muslim potentate and the Muslim leader proved that the former could still, if he wanted impose his will on his Muslim subjects.

Sir Mirza began well. In the course of his tours of the city and the districts he made contacts with the masses in the intervals of business and of pulling down of walls. Some of his colleagues disliked his taking decisions without consulting them; some thought he was a dictator; most of them admired him for his progressive views and quick decisions. At least one thorny road had been cleared for him as, between the time of the Nawab of Chattari's departure and Sir Mirza's arrival, Sir Mehdi Yar Jung had announced a solution of the Reforms tangle. It had been reached with much difficulty in the last days of Chattari's regime but it had been arranged that the announcement would be made only after his departure. The solution represented a half-way house between the published scheme and the unpublished assurance. It, therefore, made matters worse for the Hindus as well as for the Muslims. But Sir Mirza was saved the odium and

proceeded immediately with the task of elections. The State Congress boycotted the farce which the 1939 scheme had become in 1946 and negotiations to amend and liberalise it failed owing to the attitude of the Ittehad. Hyderabad's Assembly was thus composed of 50 per cent of Ittehad representatives and a heterogeneous body of Hindus belonging to newly-created organisations, some of them even friendly towards the Ittehad. One such organisation, belonging to the Depressed Classes and led by B. S. Venkat Rao, was completely under Ittehad influence.

The Muslim organisation, already opposed to Sir Mirza Ismail, received encouragement in its opposition from three individual sources. The first was Moin Nawaz Jung, the Ansari of Sir Akbar's days, who was brought down by Sir Mirza from the pedestal of *ad hoc* Membership of the Council and made Speaker of the Assembly. The second was Mir Laik Ali, his brother-in-law who was the chief financier of the Ittehad and held a virtual industrial monopoly in the State but found Sir Mirza barring his way to further acquisitions. Moin Nawaz Jung contributed the brains and the depth of still waters; Mir Laik Ali provided the money and also the influence which friendship with Mr. Jinnah brought in its wake. The third source of encouragement was Syed Taqiuddin, the Bihari, who had ingratiated himself with Bahadur Yar Jung and his successors by playing the role of a spy in Government Departments. His schemes of lavish expenditure and patronage were checked by Sir Mirza and he was forced to resign.

He joined the Ittehad and took with him not only knowledge of official secrets and strong communal, even sectarian and personal, prejudices but also a conspiring and plotting mind. In Kasim Razvi, he found a master more willing than Sir Mirza to indulge in plotting and prejudice. Within a few months of the Nizam's fight for Sir Mirza, his mind was poisoned against the Prime Minister. But Sir Mirza was different from his two immediate predecessors and, when he went to Bangalore in the summer of 1946, he wrote to the Nizam to say he would not return.

## VI

### POWER-SEEKING FANATIC

THE first two successors of Bahadur Yar Jung were comparatively mild and sensible men. Abdul Hassan Syed Ali, the first, having leanings towards responsible government. Bahadur Yar Jung and Narsing Rao had failed to arrive at a settlement, but Abdul Hassan almost succeeded but for official wire-pulling and the intrigues of certain elements in his own party. Of these, Kasim Razvi was the foremost. A graduate of Aligarh University, he began the practice of law in Latur, a town in the district of Osmanabad. There he became the local head of the Ittehad and organized a band of Muslim goondas under the leadership of a dangerous criminal, Ishaque. This gang spread terror by its rapacity and violence, and Razvi was its legal adviser, helping to secure acquittals. One day, the gang looted a food lorry and, when a few members were arrested and taken to the Police station, the gang attempted to rescue them with the help of a mob.

The Police opened effective fire and several were killed including Ishaque. A Commission, with a Muslim Judge of the High Court and a well-known Hindu Advocate as its members and a European official as its President, was appointed to investigate and report on the firing. The majority of the Commission justified the action of the Police but the Muslim Judge dissented. Government condemned his note of dissent for its traces of partiality but, within a few years, Justice Abdul Hamid Khan became both Judicial and Police Minister. The combination was strange in a State enjoying separation of the judiciary from the executive, but Kasim Razvi had to repay the debt he owed to the Judge and he repaid it by giving him both portfolios.

Kasim Razvi was a fanatic with a passion for power. He had scruples but could set them easily aside if they came in the way of his objective. Short and thin, he had a typically Arab face and his beard brought his features into prominence. His dark eyes had an extraordinary gleam. Made President of the Ittehad in 1946, he removed all those who were likely to be rivals or critics. Some of them he even ousted or tried to oust from public life by using his influence to secure jobs for them in Government service. When Government, in pursuance of the announcement of 1939, asked for names for the appointment of one Hindu and one Muslim Minister from among the elected representatives of the Assembly, he refused to submit a panel of Muslim names and insisted on his one nominee, Abdul Rahim, being appointed.

An expert organiser, he knew the use of *goum*. He was a cunning tactician, silenced opposition by a mixture of persuasion and force and worked like a demon. His friendships had always a purpose and could easily turn into enmities, as in the case of Abdul Hassan. He had good humour and a quick intelligence, even imagination, but he seldom allowed himself the liberty of tolerating an opinion different from his own. He could be charming in his manners and was a good speaker, though not a patch on Bahadur Yar Jung. The achievement of Pakistan had made a deep impression on him and, somewhere in the recesses of his mind, he must have toyed with the idea of becoming a Jinnah of the south. Although a far smaller man, he attempted to follow similar tactics. He knew that he was in a hopeless minority and that the objective of power could not be reached except by fascist methods. He adopted them in all their details and, having purged his party and emerged supreme, he made his plans to capture the Government. In this he was aided by Syed Taqiuddin who had ambitions of his own.

The plan was made easier of attainment by the return to Hyderabad of the Nawab of Chattari who once again became Prime Minister. To his mildness and lack of strength was now added the loss of self-confidence and reputation which followed the last show-down at Shah Manzil. People spoke contemptuously of his return and his stock was as low as it could be. His defeat was only a year old. He was soon to realise that he should never have returned.

The Ittehad had so far only one certain vote in the Council, Rahim's; on occasions it could rely on Pingle Venkat Rama Reddy, one of the two "popular" Ministers who, though a Hindu, sided occasionally with Rahim on what he was made to believe were "popular" issues. The rest of the Ministers were either neutral or hostile to the Ittehad. With one exception, they were Muslims but their view of the obligations of government and of true Muslim interests differed from the view adopted by the Ittehad. Kasim Razvi's first line of action was to dilute the Council by the introduction of more "dependable" elements. Thus, Moin Nawaz Jung was brought in, though not before the entry of another "undependable," Mahmood Yar Jung, who had made peace on his own terms. Planning was taken away from him (with all its industrial possibilities) and handed over to Moin Nawaz who was significantly placed in charge also of the Press and Propaganda. Chattari helped to bring Moin Nawaz back and also reinstated Syed Taqiuddin.

The next step was to capture the Police which was under Ali Yavar and, therefore, in hostile hands.

As a preliminary to the withdrawal of Paramountcy, the first reserved portfolio to be handed over to Hyderabad

was the Police, and Ali Yavar Jung was selected for the purpose. With some honourable exceptions, it was an inefficient and corrupt force which he inherited, the City Police being slightly better than the District Police. Both suffered from the evils of low pay but the latter had greater opportunities of making fortunes in connection with the procurement and supply of foodgrains. Communal partiality existed here and there but the force as a whole was disciplined enough to carry out orders without question.

Police morale stood high after the support given to the action taken against the *goondas* in Latur but when the Nawab of Chattari proposed and Sir Mirza later granted amnesty to those accused of looting and setting fire to Shah Manzil, the morale was considerably lowered. Now, the book of all revolutions prescribes that the Police should be the first citadel to be stormed and, even if no such book existed in the library of the Ittehad, it was necessary to have a Police Minister in whom it could have confidence. True, Ali Yavar Jung had permitted the annual session of the Ittehad but that was no concession but a monopoly. It was not an argument for extending a similar privilege to the State Congress which now desired and was also permitted to hold its own annual session—the first since the ban was lifted towards the latter part of Chattari's first regime.

Then, recourse was had both to strategy and stratagem, specially when it became known that the Police Minister had expressed satisfaction at the moderation and sense of responsibility shown generally by the Congress leaders and by the speakers. The *Rahbar* began to publish distorted versions of speeches, putting fire into the mouths of most of the orators. These versions differed widely from the verbatim reports and were intended to influence the highest and the lowest in the land. A section of the Council began clamouring for wholesale arrests and the arrest particularly of the President, Swami Ramanand Tirth, and the General Secretary, Madapati Ramchander Rao. Orders, warnings and threats of dissolution of the Government began falling like leaves from Vallambrosa, legal opinion was sought and ultimately only five speakers were recommended for prosecution.

The list did not include either the President or the General Secretary. Two suggestions were unofficially conveyed at this stage to the Police Minister, presumably as a final test of his attitude: the first was to hand over to the Ittehad, for distribution by it to its volunteers and others, all the muzzle-loading guns of the district and taluka Police Stations after they were replaced by more modern rifles; the second was to order the District Police not to search motor lorries bringing fire-arms from across the borders. Both suggestions are significant in

the light of the later development of the Razakar movement ; both were negatived on the ground that firearms could not be supplied to a rabble beyond the control of Government. Then there began contacts with the sentinels of the Palace and those who guarded the circuitous route between the Council and the Nizam. They were the real makers of Ministries and the future makers now began confabulating with them. With their connivance and on the pretext that his frequent visits to Delhi made it difficult for him to carry out the duties of Police Minister, that portfolio was suddenly made to change hands, with Chattari an unwilling but silent spectator. It would have been too open a coup to entrust the charge to Rahim, the Ittehad Minister, so the second best was chosen. With Moin Nawaz Jung as Police Minister, control of law and order passed to the Ittehad and the significance of the change was not lost on the public. Hindu exodus from Secunderabad began within a week.

## VII

### ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE

The Mountbatten Plan of June 3, 1947, both partitioned India and accepted the Cabinet Mission's thesis that Paramountcy should revert to the States, leaving to them the option of acceding to either of the two Dominions or having political relations with either or both. If India had not been divided, no State would or could have resisted accession despite all the constitutional niceties of the Memorandum on Paramountcy. Partition raised hopes : if Mother India could bear two sister Dominions, why not a third, the Dominion of Rajasthan ? Such an idea floated in the air for some time, but geography, commonsense and perhaps also the communal basis of the division induced most of the States in India and Pakistan to accede to the Dominion contiguous to them. Two States stood out prominently as being somewhat different from the rest, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Both Rulers belonged to a community different from the majority of the people ; both had a ruling minority which dreaded responsible government as a move to transfer power to the other community ; both ruling minorities looked for support to the particular Dominion with which they were in spiritual affinity. But there were important differences.

Hyderabad had a better administration and greater resources and the Hindu in Hyderabad had more wealth with land and

trade and commerce in his control. Kashmir, on the other hand, did not lie in the belly of Pakistan and was contiguous both to India and to Pakistan. Further, while the Hindu majority in Hyderabad favoured accession to India, both the ruling minority and a strong section of the Muslim majority in Kashmir were opposed to accession to Pakistan. This factor no less than the contiguity of Kashmir to States other than the two Dominions placed it in a far sounder strategic position than Hyderabad, and if the Ruler of Kashmir had played his cards well and played the game fairly by his people he might have won for his State a semi-independence recognized by both Dominions and a guarantee by both which might in fact have brought them together in the courtesy of a common system of defence. This is pure speculation, of course, and the raiders ended all chances of its coming true. Hyderabad, on the other hand, had no other neighbour but India, and Pakistan was over a thousand miles away even as the crow flies. Since the days of the Federal discussions, a strong feeling existed that the State should preserve its identity in any constitutional structure that may emerge in India—a feeling well-known and fully understood in Delhi. The partition of India served to strengthen that feeling; in addition, in certain sections of Muslim opinion, it both roused fears and raised hopes. The fears were due to the fact that the basis of the division of India was communal, that Hyderabad lay totally in the Hindu zone and that the Indian National Congress was hostile to the Indian States system and particularly to Hyderabad. The hopes were made largely of stuff of which dreams are made—the grace of the withdrawing British, the last gesture of a dying Empire to its Faithful Ally and Muslim influence both in the Interim Government of India and the Muslim League.

If the fears had been treated realistically and, equally, if the breath of realism had been allowed to touch the mounting pinnacles of hope, the policy of the Ittehad would have been different. The genuine fears of a minority cannot easily be brushed aside but does the remedy lie in the intensification of minority rule? Similarly, the cry of independence is a cry to be conjured with but can the independence be sustained, even if it is won, of a divided and totally dependent house? Can it be maintained only for one man or one community—and a minority at that? If the ideologists of the Ittehad knew nothing of Political Science, they were expected to know something at least of history and geography. But while Mr. Jinnah was busy making history as well as geography, his followers in Hyderabad forgot the lessons of both.

It was the demand of the State Congress that the State should accede to the Union of India; the Ittehad claimed total

independence for Hyderabad. While the latter school was represented in the Council by an influential minority, there was no Congress representative to urge the opposite point of view. One Member out-Heroded the Herod of the Ittehad by urging an immediate declaration of independence, the recall of the representatives of Berar on the Constituent Assembly and withdrawal from negotiation even of standstill arrangements. The majority, under a mandate from the Nizam, steered a midway course. It was obvious to them that "independence" was not attainable and, even if it could be attained, it could hardly be maintained without an outlet to the sea. Even semi-independence was dependent on the goodwill of India.

Theoretically, the State was "entitled" to resume sovereign independence but the question whether it would or should "resume" it could hardly be decided on the basis merely of title. Clearly, if the State did not desire to accede—and the Nizam was quite genuine in his desire not to accede to India and, still more, in his decision not to accede to Pakistan—it had in any case to accommodate itself politically, just as nature had accommodated it geographically, in India. This it could do only by a sufficient integration with India in the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications. In a more advantageous position, without a strong, central authority claiming dominion over the rest of India, the second Asaf Jah had virtually surrendered Defence and External Affairs to the British and made even cessions of territory in order to survive. That was a hundred and fifty years ago. The seventh Asaf Jah occupied a far less advantageous position, with a strong Central Government insisting on unification, the background of Paramountcy and the great democratic wave which had just swept the Empire of India off its feet. The majority of the Council, represented in the Hyderabad Delegation by Chattari himself and Ali Yavar Jung, knew that their brief was by no means easy and that, with Hyderabad a divided house, only the mutual friendship and goodwill of the two Governments could achieve a settlement, if it was to be short of accession and satisfactory to both. This was regarded by the minority as weak-kneed—too much kowtowing to power, too little of bargaining, far too goody-goody an approach altogether and one which might once for all ruin the chances of Hyderabad's independence.

They took the Memorandum on Paramountcy far too seriously and, apart from other things, forgot that independence has either to be won or recognised, that a treaty has either to be dictated or negotiated, that, in the latter case, the other party has also to agree to sign and that, size and population, revenue and resources and all the reserves here and there put together and the titles and war records, Hyderabad, even the

Premier State of Hyderabad, was after all a dwarf negotiating a treaty with a giant. It was this unreality which Rahim and Reddy—the two “popular” Ministers from the Assembly—brought with them when they were added to the Delegation, and they were added in the hope that they would come in touch with realities in Delhi and teach the lesson to their followers. But both these shrewd business men either failed to comprehend or played to the gallery or were afraid—probably the last as, when the Delegation went to Delhi, it was shadowed, the first time by Syed Taquiuddin who had not yet joined service and the second time by no less a person than the leader of the Ittehad himself. Secret documents, circulated to these popular Ministers, were studied by the leaders of the Ittehad and Rahim's notes and proposals bore a strange resemblance to the style of writing peculiar to Syed Taquiuddin, with its unrestrained superlatives and insinuations and the omission of the definite article. They tried the patience of the Delegation, specially of its Constitutional Adviser, Sir Walter Monckton.

## VIII MAKER OF MINISTRIES

THE see-saw of the negotiations dragged on throughout June and July, 1947, and it served only to show that India was insistent upon accession. All discussions led the same way and the crystal paperweight on the Conference table at Viceroy's House tempted the Governor-General, at the end of a peroration, to gaze into it and foretell the dark future which awaited Hyderabad if it did not accede. He proved to be a good prophet—and not an unreasonable negotiator despite his insistence. He had brought most of the Rulers round to see the benefits of accession; he was now busy lecturing to the rest. Kashmir was within the sphere of Pakistan (Sir Cyril Radcliffe had not yet given his award); Junagadh was on the crest of the wave seeking maritime contiguity with Pakistan. But there were some others on the waiting list.

The simple soldier of Bhopal, descendant of a long line of Indian Isabelias, two Maratha Rulers, a Sikh Maharaja, two Rajput Maharanas, were still wavering, frightened of accession, dreaming of a State's League and looking to the wizard of Travancore who at least had a sea-board for the export of his coconuts and uranium. Then came the news of a dastardly attempt made

on his life and, while the doctors were still in attendance, Travancore acceded. The waverers now gathered at Viceroy's House to sign the Instrument which they dreaded but which seemed to them their thrones and the integration of their States with the rest of India. Whether it was by reason of the fear no longer existing that a lenient attitude towards Hyderabad might encourage recalcitrance among the rest, or any other reason, there was, from this stage onwards, a decidedly more sympathetic hearing given to the Nizam's point of view. The see-saw went on; accession was still the only word; but an assurance was conveyed that standstill arrangements would continue after August 15 and that, for the time at least, a standstill would be observed with regard to Berar. Then a letter to the Governor-General was drafted by Sir Walter Monckton and approved by the Nizam, permitting the Defence and External Affairs of the State to be "conducted by" India but insisting that the basis should be other than accession. Guided by Syed Taqiuddin, Rahim saw treachery in the draft; Mr. Jinnah was approached and he treated the Delegation first to a lecture and then to a really inspiring address.

It was not Mr. Jinnah's fault that he was placed in the position of having to be consulted by the Delegation—and the Delegation itself was compelled to do so. He made no commitments and urged reasonableness in negotiating standstill arrangements. He said he would not press for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan so long as it did not accede to India—he would grant it facilities and recognition. And he said he hoped that India would do the same to Hyderabad. (The following day, however, the *Dawn* pressed for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan). If India was unreasonable, the State should act like Imam Hosain and suffer martyrdom rather than sacrifice its "independence." It was the Qaid-e-Azam speaking, and an inspiring address it was, but not all one-sided as he proceeded to elaborate his views on responsible government. He said it had not been introduced all of a sudden in British India, that it required political experience and training and that it should come gradually in the States as in British India. Unlike Bahadur Shah Jung, he said the principle of gradual approach applied equally to Kashmir and Hyderabad but both States—and it was here that the shoe pinched—must make a beginning, must take their people into confidence, must proceed not at jog-trot pace but with speed. The majority of the Delegation thought the best plan would be to descend to the earth of politics rather than flit in the seventh heaven of martyrdom. Where were the men to be martyrs? The discussion was surely about a letter which purported to cede Defence and External Affairs by an agreement short of accession. The problem was essentially earthy. So, Chatterji thought it best to address a list of worldly questions in order to ascertain how and in what directions the new world of Pakistan would come

to the rescue of the old State of Hyderabad if it was faced with disaster. It was a clever move, intended to corner perhaps but certainly designed to inject more responsibility into advice. Mr. Jinnah gave a characteristically decisive reply. He was in no doubt that Pakistan could not help in any material fashion. It was at this stage that Kasim Razvi returned to Hyderabad and made a public statement purporting to expose the machinations of Chhattari, Ali Yavar Jung and Sir Walter Monckton.

They were alleged to have conspired against the State, to have held secret meetings with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, to have sold themselves to Sardar Patel, to have kept their two "popular" colleagues in the dark and to have ignored the Muslim League element in the Interim Government. Chhattari was supposed to have followed this line because of his vested interests in the United Provinces; Ali Yavar Jung was alleged to be under the influence of Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel; Sir Walter Monckton was accused of friendship with Lord Mountbatten. The head of the traitors was supposed to be Ali Yavar Jung, with Chhattari and Monckton following his lead. Rahim and Reddy were said to have saved the State by their intervention and prevented the issue of a letter conveying the terms of surrender. The awkward point about the letter having already been approved by the Nizam himself was conveniently covered by the allegation that the draft so approved was not the same as the draft intended to be delivered to the Governor-General!

Now, the truth is the sort of position into which some people are never put, and the lies told were the sort of sensational stuff which would appeal to low minds and create suspicion among the habitués of tea shops. Whether Kasim Razvi himself believed in the story he thus put out is a matter for conjecture, but mention of the heroic part played by Syed Taqiuddin in the discovery of the alleged treason showed that he was a part-author. Chhattari was pressed by Sir Walter Monckton and Ali Yavar Jung for a public statement but it was too much to expect firm leadership from him and the Delegation returned to Hyderabad under the shadow of suspicion. Incidentally, the statement was a public testimony to the way in which the wind was now blowing in Hyderabad and an acknowledgment that one Minister at least was ignoring the oath of secrecy taken by him upon assumption of office.

Now, despite all the cheap gibes levelled at Chhattari he was both a gentleman and a very shrewd judge of events. His main difficulty was that he had no influence over the Nizam and was losing hold over the administration. He had originally been brought with the support of the Paramount Power; that concern was now in the process of liquidation. The Hindus were not in a mood nor had they any reason to

support him; the Muslims were busy writing his epitaph. He in turn warned the Ittehad leaders against the course they were following. He guessed that they were aiming at capturing the Government and knew that he had neither the strength nor the support necessary to prevent it. He knew also that things were drifting beyond his control and, in consultation with his Doctors, he suddenly developed a series of heart attacks in preparation of leave to retire.

Like the father who allows his child to smoke so that he might never wish to smoke again, Chattari thought the Ittehad should be allowed a hand in the negotiations, if not in the Government, so that it might come in touch with realities and learn a lesson. He believed that however favourable the terms negotiated by the Delegation it would always be said that they could have been better. He had obtained from Mr. Jinnah himself the admission that Pakistan could assist Hyderabad in no material way and he followed the same technique with regard to the supply of arms and ammunition. For, realising which way the wind was blowing in Hyderabad, India was delaying the supply required for the State. The minority in the Council pressed that Pakistan should be approached. Mr. Jinnah was accordingly asked, and he flatly refused to spare a single gun. It was about this time that, in spite of Chattari's own opposition and all the arguments urged by Sir Walter Monckton and the Constitutional Affairs Minister, the Army Commander was sent to London to negotiate an arms deal with certain continental manufacturers. The question does not appear ever to have been brought up before the Council.

The date-line of August 15 was now fast approaching and the letter to the Governor-General, still in draft form, had to be issued in order to place Hyderabad's views on record. Chattari enlisted the good offices of Mir Laik Ali in order to persuade the Ittehad to agree to a slightly modified draft which was issued to Lord Mountbatten under the signature of the Nizam on August 8. From that time onwards, till his departure in October as the Delegate of Pakistan to the United Nations, Mir Laik Ali came off and on into the picture and it cannot be said that he played an unhelpful role.

The Nizam's letter offered "general conformity" with the policy of India on the three Union subjects on the basis of a treaty; it elicited the reply that negotiations would continue for a period of two months during which the offer of the terms of accession would remain open. The talks progressed in August and the Governor-General, addressing the Constituent Assembly on the night of August 14, declared that the Nizam had not so far felt able to accede, that he was, however, ready to co-operate in the three Union subjects and that the Governor-

General was hopeful of reaching a solution "satisfactory to all". Standstill arrangements were being concluded with all the States for a year with respect to subjects other than the three Union subjects in order to avoid an administrative breakdown; the compromise was now in sight that, for a limited period, Hyderabad's Defence, External Affairs and Communications would also be dealt with on a standstill basis. Accordingly, the drafting of the heads of agreement was taken in hand.

It fell to the Constitutional Affairs Department to analyse the problems, examine the details and submit the results in the light of the Nizam's instructions. The brunt of the negotiations (and of the odium) was borne by Sir Walter Monckton and the Minister-in-charge. As the talks proceeded, it became clearer than ever before that, locked in the belly of India, the survival of the State itself required "integration" with India on the three Union subjects, even if the mode of integration was a treaty or agreement and not an instrument of accession.

It was equally clear that Hyderabad, whether as an acceding or a non-acceding unit and more so as the latter, could not be maintained except by the will and support of its people. Whatever its shape or form, there must be an immediate beginning made in the "transfer of power". These were the heresies and innovations which brought on the Minister the ire and disapproval of the gods and, on August 20, he tendered his resignation. It was not accepted but he was told that, in deference to the opposition of the Ittehad, he would soon have to cease to be Minister for Constitutional Affairs, while continuing to hold charge of other portfolios. On August 23, he replied drawing pointed attention to the dangers of a Minister recruited from the Services being expected to look for support to the Ittehad, and he insisted on his resignation being accepted or his being given leave to retire.

It was evident to him that Ministers were now being made and unmade by the ruling coterie in the Ittehad, aided by at least two Members of the Council and some senior officials, two of whom at least had access to the Palace. Early in August, it had been suggested to him that, in all questions of policy going before the Council, he should have prior consultation with certain of his colleagues, three in number, in whom the Ittehad appeared to have confidence, and should follow the decision of the majority. He had rejected the suggestion on the ground that it would create a cabal inside the Council. Since then he had expected trouble. Even otherwise, his position had become untenable with suggestions, seriously made and pressed, that he should proceed to Washington and London, duly guarded by Mir Laik Ali, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States and Britain!

This was comedy on a grand scale, but could anything have been more ridiculous than the suggestion, which sent Sir Walter Monckton into a rage, that an agreement similar to that under contemplation with India, entrusting the conduct of the State's Defence, External Affairs and Communications to India, should be concluded also with Pakistan? On the plane of realities, the warnings given of such possibilities as an economic blockade were ignored. Suspicions were being deliberately created. The short break in the air journey from Bombay to Madras of India's High Commissioner to London and a friendly talk between him, Chattari and Ali Yavar Jung were splashed as a scoop by the *Meezan* with the suggestion of a new conspiracy, and the Nizam made an immediate enquiry to find out what had transpired. On August 21, the Ittehad passed a resolution condemning what it characterised as the weak policy of the Constitutional Affairs Minister; it demanded his resignation and recorded a vote of no-confidence not only in him but in Chattari and Sir Walter Monckton as well.

## IX

## COUP D'ETAT

ON August 15, 1947, the morning after a banquet at which he had joined the Nizam in the hope that "a new relationship" would be created between Britain and Hyderabad, the last British Resident left the State. The event made different impressions on different minds. To the two "popular" Ministers the moment seemed appropriate for collaboration in a proposal to alter the State crest to read "His Majesty" in place of "His Exalted Highness". There had been similar collaboration earlier in the less inspiring but more profitable proposal to raise the motor car allowance of Ministers; August 15 inspired higher objectives. But the man most concerned seemed to realise, however vaguely, all that the date signified. Two hundred years of history had vanished in the train which took Mr. Herbert away—and he had left Paramountcy behind.

This parvenu in the sanctum of treaties had grown with the emergence of a strong central government in India, had served to bind that part of India which was not directly administered to the part which was, had acted for the benefit sometimes of India as a whole, sometimes of Imperial interests, occasionally of the

people of the States by affording them protection against gross misrule. Since the treaties were "inviolable and inviolable," this newcomer had saved them from the necessity of revision and adjusted a relationship otherwise becoming obsolete to the demands of changing times. Assailed for being an occasional bully, Paramountcy had refused to define itself and insisted on remaining Paramount. Autocrats resented its autocracy but they knew that it had kept them on their thrones and, wherever it had intervened for the benefit of the people, it had introduced only a mild, Victorian variety of liberalism which kept democracy at a fair distance. For a hundred and fifty years, it had secured the Rulers of States against the dangers of rebellion, given them titles and insignia and administered occasional "advice".

These comfortable and secure careers had developed various hobbies and attitudes of mind and made lonely men out of the majority, lonely, jealous of power and suspicious of all men specially their own Ministers. In some cases, as one Minister has aptly remarked, the Rulers had been the Leaders of the Opposition to their own Governments. Paramountcy had seldom intervened to check peccadillos: it had always believed in the long rope. During the years of World War II, the rope became longer, for the allies had to be kept faithful to the alliance. It was a new phase of Paramountcy; it began tolerating attacks against itself and small defiance of authority. Then suddenly, with the War over, three men in Delhi began talking of British withdrawal and of leaving Paramountcy behind. That is what happened when Mr. Herbert left Hyderabad on August 15, 1947, and, on that date, the Nizam became, in theory at least, an independent sovereign. But he knew that Paramountcy would soon ask for a Paramount Power and, while he was negotiating with a claimant, the exponents of a new Political Science were claiming that Paramountcy should go neither to India, nor to him nor to the people as a whole but to the Ittehad as representative of the Muslims of the State. It was a revival of the political Kalema of Bahadur Yar Jung's days and a logical consequence of it, and the "Ittehad" was told that the new Paramountcy would protect him as it had did the old.

The doctrine that every Muslim was a shareholder in the concern of Kingship implied a new Fascism to which were now added some of the more convenient duties of the Paramount Power, including the task of meeting the Satyagraha declared (early in August) by the State Congress. But while the new Paramountcy could reside at Dar-es-Salaam the new Fascism had to function from Shah Manzil. It was still in a minority in the Council and on the Negotiating Committee, for Chattari and Sir Walter Monckton continued and Ali Yavar Jung was replaced by Sir Sultan Ahmed and Ali Nawaz Jung. For the Ittehad,

Sir Sultan, though a Bihari, had none of Syed Taqiuddin's virtues and Ali Nawaz Jung had recently held meetings in order to persuade Ittehadis to keep Kasim Razvi out of the Presidential election. Having declared to the Special Correspondent of the *Times of India* that, now that Ali Yavar Jung was out, he was satisfied that the negotiations would be loyally conducted, Kasim Razvi could hardly object when the Nizam quietly excluded Reddy and Rahim from the Negotiating Committee and sent the rest to Delhi in the third week of September.

They took with them the heads of agreement which had been under preparation in Hyderabad : they paid another visit in the middle of October and they brought back an agreed draft. With some minor modifications, it won the approval of the majority of the Members of Council, but one out of the minority voted for a breakdown while the remaining three raised certain fundamental objections. The Nizam agreed with the majority and fixed October 28 for his signature and for the departure of the Delegation to Delhi. Meanwhile, three emissaries of the Ittehad left Hyderabad for Karachi by air and a friend who learnt accidentally of their departure took a bet that Sir Walter Monckton would not be able to leave for Delhi on the 28th. That morning at three o'clock, Muslim crowds surrounded the residences of Chattari, Sir Sultan, Sir Walter Monckton and Ali Nawaz Jung, and, at daybreak, the Delegation discovered that it was the victim of a *coup d'etat*. All was silent in the city ; the Army remained in its barracks and the Police in its quarters. The crowds did not disperse until they were given the assurance that the Delegation would not leave for Delhi. For the first time in his life, the Nizam held a meeting of the Council in his own Palace.

He called for the views of each Member, snubbed those who, under his gaze, were inclined to be equivocal and explained at length the reasons why he agreed with the majority and favoured the conclusion of the agreement. Angry scenes followed this meeting at the Palace, for Sir Walter Monckton rebuked the Commissioner of Police for his inaction only to get the reply that the Police, if ordered to intervene, would have refused to resist the Muslim crowds. If that was so, would the Army also have refused? If not, why was no preparation made? Did the Police not know at all? Was no report made to Moin Nawaz Jung, the Police Minister, or to the Police Commissioner himself, by the Intelligence Department? Was the Police in league? These were the questions which were uppermost in people's minds and in Sir Walter's but who was to answer them?

Writing six months later, the Governor-General of India referred to this incident and the part played in it by the Police, and he said that the history of the relations between India and

Hyderabad would have been written "by a very different and far happier pen" if such methods of coercion had not been permitted to interfere with the carrying out of the Nizam's wishes at so critical a moment. But that is only half the story, for the crowds sent by Kasim Razvi did not only set aside the commands of the Nizam that the agreement should be signed; they proclaimed to the world that the will of the Nizam counted for nothing and that the Police and the Government were theirs. It was an easier triumph than the march to Rome, but the imperative was the same, and so were the results, for now Hyderabad had a Victor Emmanuel and a Mussolini.

A new Delegation now went to Delhi and Chattari kept out of it. It was composed of the objectors, Moin Nawaz Jung, the leader, and the two "popular" Ministers. Thanks to the good offices of a gentleman by the name of Joshi, an appointment was arranged between Sardar Patel and Kasim Razvi and the latter also left for Delhi with the false aura of an invitation. The objectors signed the same draft agreement as the one to which they had objected, and they brought back, along with it, a collateral letter from the Governor-General worse in many respects than the draft brought by the previous Delegation (except for a more high-sounding designation for trade agents). Explaining this achievement, Kasim Razvi declared in a speech that he had spoken to Sardar Patel as none had ever spoken to him before, and that the Delegation had done its best to repair the damage done by the previous Delegation. No one dared to ask what concessions he had wrung out of Sardar Patel or how the agreement signed by Moin Nawaz Jung differed from the agreement to which he had objected. In fact, with becoming dignity, Chattari signed a resolution of the Council recording its appreciation of the able manner in which the agreement was negotiated by the new Delegation! That was the Standstill Agreement signed on November 29, 1947. Chattari left a few days later and the Nizam, still unwilling to surrender, appointed Sir Mehdi Yar Jung as Prime Minister.

## LAIK ALI INSTALLED

IT was not until December 1, 1947, that Mir Laik Ali became Prime Minister of Hyderabad. He had been recommended by the Ittehad as the one acceptable Mulki and, since Mr. Gulam Mahomed, Pakistan's Finance Minister (who was the first choice of the Ittehad), was unable to accept the offer, the Nizam agreed that Mir Laik Ali should be approached. He accepted it after a good deal of hesitation and not without first obtaining Mr. Jinnah's permission which was given for the limited period of a year. With a large industrial stake both in Hyderabad and Pakistan, he was too decidedly a vested interest for his choice to be popular and it was known that he financed the Ittehad. But he had many Hindu friends in the profession of industry and, when he began by releasing Congress prisoners from jail, it was thought that he would rise to the occasion and use the year of grace afforded by the Standstill Agreement to the good purpose of an enduring settlement of the internal problem. Instead, the discussions with the leaders of the State Congress were half-hearted and inconclusive, and no serious effort was made to grapple with the issues. They gave the impression that no business was meant. The Prime Minister did not even appear on the scene and the talks were conducted by Moin Nawaz Jung.

Yet, Mir Laik Ali had the opportunity, denied to previous Governments, of reaching a settlement without inviting the wrath of the Ittehad, of influencing it in the right direction and of securing acceptance by the Nizam. He proved either too weak or too much of a party man to take an independent line. Neither politics nor administration was his *metier* and, in both, he took counsel from Moin Nawaz Jung who combined administrative ability with narrowness of political outlook and imagination. He exercised great influence over Mir Laik Ali ; in fact, it was said that the Prime Minister was keeping his seat warm for his brother-in-law to take over when the moment was propitious. That is why none of his senior colleagues in the Council from among the Service Ministers was taken into the new Government which Mir Laik Ali announced in January. It was a Government composed of four Ittehad members of the Assembly, four Hindus and four officials. Mir Laik Ali was the Prime Minister and Reddy was made Vice-President of the Council. With the sole exception of Pundit Ramachari, an ex-Congressite and a gentleman, the three Hindu members were taken from the Assembly and, besides being totally unrepresentative, owed their

elevation to Kasim Razvi. One of them was an Untouchable whose organisation was a sort of plaything for the Ittehad. Reddy was no longer a "popular" Minister; he had been repudiated by his party but was nominated by the Nizam. Rahim continued as an Ittehad Minister and was the best among that group, the worst being Yamin Zubairi. Even Mir Laik Ali disliked his entry into the Council but, in Rahim's phraseology, the Ittehad had some grown-up daughters whom it had to get married in order to keep them above mischief, and Kasim Razvi insisted that Yamin should be included. Even the officials were selected with the approval of Kasim Razvi, not the Nizam. It thus came about that, with one single exception, the entire Government owed its allegiance to the Ittehad. The new Paramountcy had "advised" on the selection of the new Ministers and Fascism had now fulfilled itself by capturing the whole of the Government.

It is not known to whose fertile imagination the Razakars owed their origin but it is certain that the movement could not have succeeded without the help of the Government. The supply of rations, uniforms, firearms and training, and payment of allowances to such a large number of men was beyond the capacity of the Ittehad despite all the assistance given by the more enthusiastic Muslim industrialists. To save the Government from the accusation that it was assisting a communal militia, a page was stolen from the book of Allama Mashriqi and, as in the Khaksar movement, "desirable" Hindus were also recruited.

In any case, there were the followers of B. S. Venkat Rao, the "popular" Minister who led the Untouchables into this new martial caste. Kasim Razvi was himself its Chief Commander—with the rank of Field Marshal, some say—and where the commanders and section commanders were good the force was well disciplined. Otherwise, they broke loose and combined patriotism with looting and arson. Occasionally, they also indulged in murder and rape. Sometimes, they came in conflict with the Police and Army, but the Police, wherever it intervened, was either suppressed or discouraged and few atrocities were punished. Kasim Razvi and Mir Laik Ali used to admit that the Razakars had committed atrocities but, till September 16, 1948, they were unwilling to think of their disbandment. They lost the best opportunity for such action when, following the assassination of the Father of the Nation, communal volunteer movements like the R.S.S. were banned all over India. The Nizam's Government paid a wordy tribute to the greatness that had departed but a more fitting homage (and a great service to Hyderabad) would have been the disbandment of the Razakars.

The story of the negotiations with Delhi after the conclusion of the Standstill Agreement can be gleaned from the two volumes of the White Paper issued by the Nizam's Government and the

two corresponding volumes (which are more up-to-date) published by India. It is a story of allegations and counter-allegations of breaches of the Standstill Agreement, of subversive or unbecoming propaganda, of raids into one another's territory, of a loan to Pakistan and a discriminating Currency Ordinance on the one side and economic blockade on the other. These pleasant proceedings were interrupted occasionally by flashy speeches.

Hyderabad's Agent-General in London declared quite unnecessarily that armed aggression by India would be resisted by Hyderabad's Army and that force would be met by force. Such iron was never suspected in the gaities of Hyderabad House but it soon melted as the Nizam threatened to recall his agent. The ball had, however, been set rolling and the statement found an answer a few weeks later in a speech by the States' Minister. One day, however, a small, bearded man in Razakar uniform shouted before a thrilled audience that he and his legions would march to Delhi and plant the Asafia Flag on the Red Fort. There was an idea behind this threat, for, if Hyderabad could not integrate with India, why should not India be made to integrate with Hyderabad? The conquest was also to be from sea to sea as was made clear a little later when the same small, bearded man in Razakar uniform declared that the waters of the Bay of Bengal would wash the feet of the Nizam. It was a strange mixture of roles, a combination of Emperor of India and King Canute, and it mattered little if the Nizam liked it or not. The new Hyderabad had to have its Mare Nostrum.

## XI

### APPROVED AND REJECTED

NEGOTIATIONS over the agreement which was to replace the Standstill Agreement of November, 1947, broke down in June, 1948. Three drafts were prepared in Delhi, a collateral letter from the Prime Minister of India conveying certain assurances, the Agreement itself and a Firman. The picture which these documents presented was of a Hyderabad bound by agreement to pass Union legislation on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications, to limit the strength of its Army to 20,000, to accept the Indian States Forces Scheme of 1939 with its attendant advantage of supply of arms, ammunition and equipment and its requirements of inspection and furnishing

of information, and to limit the irregular forces to 8,000. All other military formations, except ceremonial and household guards, were to be disbanded, including the Razakars who, however, were to be disbanded progressively within three months.

India was not to station her armed forces inside the State except in an emergency declared under Section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935. (The last of the Indian Army had left Bolarum in February, 1948, according to schedule). Hyderabad's external relations were to be conducted by India but Hyderabad was to have the liberty to establish trade agencies in other countries which would function under the supervision of India. Hyderabad was not to have political relations with any other country. Existing agreements and arrangements in regard to matters of common concern were to continue as under the Standstill Agreement and India was to do her utmost to ensure the flow of goods of all kinds "at present held up between Hyderabad and India."

India desired to collaborate on a joint basis in Hyderabad's economic development and agreed to afford all facilities to that end. There was to be no unfair discrimination against Hyderabad in the working of the new Agreement. Two questions were left over for sympathetic consideration as they could not be settled in isolation or without reference to the constitution of the organisations concerned. The first was Hyderabad's desire to control her own overseas export and import trade, subject to the transactions being through the Reserve Bank of India. The second was the question of Hyderabad's membership of certain international bodies like the F.A.O., the Postal Union and the Monetary Fund. As far as the constitutional questions were concerned, the issue of accession was to be settled by a plebiscite to be held on the basis of adult franchise and under impartial and independent supervision. A Constituent Assembly was to be established early in 1949 with the object of introducing responsible government; meanwhile, a new Interim Government was to be established in consultation with the leaders of the major political parties.

The drafts containing these proposals were the outcome of discussions between the States Ministry and the Hyderabad Delegation in June, 1948. They were substantially the same as the proposals contained in the draft Heads of Agreement approved by Hyderabad's Council on June 6, read in the light of Mir Laik Ali's proposals of June 14, except that these Heads did not include the disbandment of the Razakars, the acceptance of the State's Forces Scheme or the Stationing of Indian troops in the State in an emergency. On the other hand, they included arbitration, the determination of the basis of the Constituent Assembly "keeping in view the traditions of

Hyderabad" and the 50 : 50 rule of representation in the new Interim Government.

Some of these points of difference appear obviously to have been dropped in the course of negotiation, as the Nizam's telegram of June 16, criticising the three drafts, drew attention only to the demand for freedom in trade, economic and fiscal matters, the basis of the Constituent Assembly and the 50 : 50 rule of representations on the new Interim Government. A second telegram added two other objections, namely, arbitration and the stationing of troops in an emergency. The second telegram withdrew an allegation made in the first that the drafts handed over to Mir Laik Ali on June 15 were not made known to the Hyderabad representatives in Delhi until the last moment. The upshot of it all was that the drafts were rejected by Hyderabad. On June 17, India's Prime Minister explained at a Press Conference that the principal matters contained in the drafts had been "more or less" accepted by the Hyderabad Delegation and this was never denied. The conjecture is that the drafts were rejected by the Ittehad after the return of the Delegation, its principal objection being to the disbandment of the Razakars. For reasons of policy, however, that objection was not stated. That the drafts were more or less accepted by the Delegation is evident from the fact that one member of the Delegation was left behind to sign them upon intimation of formal approval from Hyderabad.

These drafts compared most unfavourably with the Standstill Agreement despite the fact that they were also intended for a short period. They conceded the substance of accession without the advantages of accession. Instead, there was a strong odour of Paramountcy. That was the logical consequence of non-accession, for, as explained by India's Prime Minister, if Hyderabad was not to be independent—which it could not be in the conditions of its geography—it would either have to accede or accept Paramountcy. The question arises : where was the hurry and what was the necessity for introducing Paramountcy and achieving the substance of accession for the short period between the lapse of the Standstill Agreement and the holding of the plebiscite ? It was said at the time in Hyderabad that India feared that the results of the plebiscite would go against accession and that she, therefore, tried to drive a hard bargain in anticipation of the future. But that was wishful thinking. No one except the Ittehad High Command and the Ministers ever thought that the plebiscite would go against accession. In making the offer of a plebiscite Hyderabad was not only thinking of world opinion ; it was also relying on the following provided by B. S. Venkat Rao, on the Muslim vote itself, on its own local authorities and on the silencing of all opinion in favour of accession by

Police and Razakar activity. It never occurred to the Nizam's Government that no international body would look at a plebiscite conducted in the conditions prevailing in Hyderabad at the time, for a plebiscite postulates impartial administration and conditions of security which would ensure freedom of opinion. In fact, the very character and conduct of the Nizam's Government were the chief reasons for the insistence on the substance of accession and the introduction of Paramountcy even before the plebiscite.

The Standstill Agreement was negotiated at a time when there was some sort of a "Nizam's Government"; there was now a one-party Government and concessions could in no case be made to a Government which was converting Hyderabad into a hostile base against India. This it did in many ways, by supporting Razakar activities, by virulent propaganda, by conspiracy with hostile elements in Pakistan and, above all, by the constant importation on a large scale of modern weapons of war. The early deals concluded in London were known to India through information from India House; more information poured in as the momentum increased and a tall, flaxen-haired Australian began to cross the air space of India by day and by night in violation of international conventions. He became almost a legend in Hyderabad, a knight-errant of the air, and his chivalry received more than adequate payment.

## XII

### RAZAKAR RULE

THE conditions inside the State, in the beginning at least, were not as bad as they were depicted to be. After December, however, there was a steady deterioration. Foreign journalists seeing the face of the capital city and taken on conducted tours to villages were deceived by the outward calm. But all was not well inside. The administration was on the verge of collapse. While the Prime Minister was priding himself that corruption and nepotism were being eradicated, they were flourishing, and incompetence presided over the fortunes of most of the Departments.

Secretaries and Directors were mostly busy with accommodating appointments ordered over the telephone. Except where the recommendations of the Public Service Commission were

accepted—and that body was openly attacked by one wing of the Ittehad in the Assembly — recruitment and promotion depended generally upon opinions entertained in Dar-es-salaam or the branches of the genealogical tree. If some shreds of administration remained, it was due to the traditions of certain Departments and the conduct of those officials who, be it said to their credit, remained uncorrupted by politics or the attractions of easy money. From the Secretariate downwards they kept the administration going at the most difficult and trying time in the history of the State.

In such a background, the regulation promulgated for dealing with corrupt officials and the action taken under it provoked more than a smile. Impartial officials were removed from key positions or positions not within easy control and transferred to "harmless" posts. Officials who had sought or been made to take leave prior to premature retirement (because they could not see eye to eye with the Ittehad) were carefully watched; some of them were offered tempting assignments outside Hyderabad and even abroad with indirect suggestions that, being still in service, they could not refuse. Every attempt was made by the party to get them out of the way, and an inner circle planned "liquidation" and prepared a list of those who were to die accidentally when the time came.

Politics were totally one-sided, having reached a stage of simplification which left no rival in the field. The only possible rival, with its leader and many workers in jail, preferred to function from outside. Occasional press statements and resolutions reminded people that the State Congress was still alive and calling for help. Sometimes a voice was raised in the press but the majority of newspapers sang praises of the administration, of the remarkable harmony existing in the State and the benefits of the "good" Government of Mir Laik Ali. Rais' paper, the *Waqf*, had the singular honour of having been suppressed several times for accusing Kasim Razvi and the Government of such an unknown thing as weakness. In his own way, Syed Taqiuddin was making trouble. Promises to influential sons-in-law that he would secure them certain important jobs in Hyderabad's "Embassies" in Egypt and other countries met with little response from fathers-in-law who had grown wiser in the interval, but when public service like the hounding out of Sir Mirza, Chattari and other Ministers and the enthronement of the Ittehad Ministry went unrewarded and even the Chief Secretaryship was given away by Mir Laik Ali to another, Syed Taqiuddin developed a sudden sympathy for the non-gazetted employees and encouraged them to agitate.

In the districts, the forces of law and order were gradually giving way.

When accused of dealing shabbily with the State Congress, some Ministers asserted that the disciples of non-violence with whom they were asked to negotiate were actively engaged in violence and subversion. The facts of the raids into border villages and attacks on customs outposts, have only recently been made public but, serious as they were, they afforded no justification for the growth and encouragement of a private army.

It is true that the Government and the party controlling the Razakars were one and the same but the responsibilities of a Government are different and the existence of a force beyond the direct control of the State is bound perceptibly to influence the shaping of policy and even expressions of opinion. To add to the chaos and the occasional holocausts in Nalgonda, the Untouchable followers of B. S. Venkat Rao and Sham Sunder were creating confusion in the district of Bidar. On the whole, only the Army remained disciplined and impartial, despite every attempt to tamper with its loyalty. It had its own pockets of fanaticism and false enthusiasm, with some ladies collecting funds and some Army personnel instructed to teach society women how to pull the trigger and handle a gun—attractive exercises which were occasionally attended by the Dictator himself who, the story goes, came one day in plastic shoes and nearly lost his life by stepping into the line of firing. These Lady Razakars had their own fanatics but they contented themselves with giving vent to their husbands' spleen or prejudices and with an occasional remark that so-and-so was a "traitor." But, so far as the Razakars were concerned, the Army disliked them and the Commander thought it was "madness" to have started the movement. No Commander worth his name could have thought otherwise.

The Razakars collected money forcibly from villagers and from the well-to-do in towns; they also collected the signatures of Hindus on petitions requesting the Government to maintain the force as it gave them protection. Few citizens of Hyderabad or Secunderabad knew much about the happenings in the districts; those who knew had no platform, and propaganda in the press and on the radio presented a totally unreal picture. Hyderabad was depicted as a peaceful heaven, the home of harmony. It is true that there were many cases of Hindus giving protection to Muslims and Muslims protecting Hindus against violence but that was due to the long tradition of unity—which still lingers—rather than to anything done by the Government which soon began to lose control over law and order. The process was accelerated by making over each district to two Members of Council, one Hindu and one Muslim, so that law and order remained no longer the responsibility of any one

Department or Minister. These were the conditions which promoted Hindu exodus on a large scale to the neighbouring Provinces and the evacuees took with them the bitterest of memories and injected them into the minds and hearts of the people who surrounded the State. The very name of Hyderabad became anathema to them.

Now, history and geography had combined to give one clear lesson to all administrators of Hyderabad, that no Central Government in India (unless it was too weak for the task) could remain an idle spectator of misrule or disorder in the State or permit the vast expanse of the Deccan, sprawling across the main arteries of India's vital communications, to become a hostile base. That was the lesson of a hundred and fifty years of British rule and the explanation underlying the several interventions of Paramountcy. In a minute recorded in the first decade of the nineteenth century, an acting Governor-General, Sir George Barlow, expressed the view that annexation was the only remedy against a hostile Hyderabad, that if Hyderabad wished to be preserved it would have to remain friendly and, if annexation was to be avoided, friendliness would have to be ensured by interference and advice. The centre inherited by the successors of British rule was far stronger than anything imagined by Sir George Barlow and the medicine prescribed by him was a patent well-known to all the doctors in Delhi. But the patient, the new administration in Hyderabad, insisted on developing both the cough and the fever for which it was prescribed. To the spread of disorder, with its obvious repercussions all over India, was added a feverish traffic in arms which excited even international suspicion. It is in this context, of mutual hatred and distrust inside and outside, and not in the context of the Standstill Agreement, that the offer contained in the June drafts must be viewed. The world in which that Agreement was born was different from the world of June, 1948, and had vanished at day break on a certain day in October when crowds prevented four men from taking a signed paper to Delhi. Other men carried it instead a month later, but it was no longer a Standstill but a still-born agreement. And now, with fire in Kashmir and smoke in Hyderabad, the June offer was surprisingly tempting and the Delegation acted rightly in accepting it. But, back at home, they were confronted with men, in the Council and the party, who refused to look beyond their noses. It is true that there was nothing in the offer with which to save the faces of those who had raised a clamour even against the Standstill Agreement, and the Ministers to blame were now of their own creation. Rais was certain to raise a storm and the ruling clique would lose its hold with the disbandment of the Razakars. That clique and the Government consisted of small men who allowed petty considerations to come between them

and a settlement with India. If, at that time, Mir Laik Ali had tendered his resignation, he would have acted both with courage and with consistency and the majority of the Council might have gone with him. It is said that he was secretly threatened against such a course, so he allowed some of the objections (to which he himself attached importance) to eclipse the picture as a whole. Perhaps he never imagined that the door to further negotiation would be closed and he would be faced with having to sign on the dotted line or the consequences of a breakdown. Unfortunately, he chose the latter.

The *communiqué* issued by the Nizam's Government on June 17, accused India of insisting on the substance of accession even before the issue of accession was decided by the proposed plebiscite. The White Paper was published subsequently and revealed that the heads of agreement approved by the Council on June 16 and the proposals made by Hyderabad's Prime Minister on June 14 contained nothing less than the substance of accession. When that was so, was it wise to insist on points which would automatically resolve themselves once the plebiscite was over? An immediate consequence of the breakdown was the "tightening" of the economic blockade against Hyderabad which, in practice, went beyond the stopping only of articles and commodities required for military preparations and, therefore soon paralysed the economy of the State.

Indian securities held by the Nizam's Government were frozen and private holdings of Hyderabad citizens in Indian banks were transferred to a "blocked" account. The licence given to the Deccan Airways for the carriage of goods and passengers over the air space of India was cancelled in order to clear the air and facilitate the search for planes carrying firearms to Hyderabad. But Sydney Cotton and such shareholders as he may have had in this paying concern of gun-running were undeterred by these obstacles, and "mercy" planes landed as usual at the aerodrome at Bidar. Fifty thousand rupees are said to have been paid for each flight and the trade became a combination of patriotism with big business. It was a sort of love marriage with an heiress and combined yearning with earning. There was big money also in breaking the blockade in other directions, and it is said that on this front at least, if on no other, Hindus and Muslims stood united.

### XIII

## ACCESS BARRED

IT was decreed in Mr. Munshi's horoscope that Hyderabad would make decennial entries into his life. It made its first entry in 1938 when, as Home Minister of Bombay, he was called upon to deal with the repercussions of the Arya Satyagraha in the Province of Bombay. The second entry was in 1948 when Mr. Munshi arrived at Hyderabad as Agent-General of India. The mission began badly, with an unnecessary controversy over a building which, it was feared, had not been sufficiently fumigated to destroy the germs of Paramountcy, and it was believed they would infect Mr. Munshi. So, in the interests of Mr. Munshi's political health, a safer abode was chosen for him and "Deccan House" of the old Cantonment days became the "Dakshina Sadan" of India's Agent-General.

It was natural that the relations between Shah Manzil and Dakshina Sadan should reflect the changes in the Delhi-Hyderabad barometer and, as the latter began to record tension, the former showed signs of strain. Not so the relations between Hyderabad's Agent-General in Delhi and the Government of India. To Zain Yar Jung's social gifts was added the advantage of having been kept out of the negotiations by the powers in Hyderabad; he thus remained happily unaffected by any rise or fall in the political barometer. Mr. Munshi's position was different; he was in the thick of the discussions. So, while Zain Yar Jung, under forced unconcern, continued successfully to cultivate goodwill, Mr. Munshi found that type of agriculture unsuited to the climate which then prevailed in Hyderabad. He, therefore, decided to go into intellectual exile and chose the realm of historical fiction. Dakshina Sadan was under a cloud and even invitees to such functions as the eating of vegetarian dishes and the drinking of pure water were treated as suspects, whether they accepted the invitation or not. There was masterly inactivity in Mr. Munshi's seclusion, for he kept himself informed of all events and trends of thought, and he tried till September 11, when he had his last dinner with Mir Laik Ali, to obtain a settlement.

In Delhi, Hyderabad's Agent-General had free access to the Governor-General and the Ministers, and no secretaries dogged his footsteps by their presence at interviews; in Hyderabad, Mr. Munshi's access to the Nizam was barred and bolted. Long arguments took place between the Nizam and his Ministers, with the former insisting on seeing Mr. Munshi alone and the latter persisting in denying him that freedom unless one of them was present. Even the compromise of the Nizam's own Secretary

being present was unacceptable to the Ministers who seemed fundamentally opposed to the idea of two men taking tea together. One such scene was pitiable to watch, with the Nizam literally pleading and suggesting alternatives. It was obvious that the constitution had undergone a change; the Nizam had now to possess the confidence of his Ministers. So, Mr. Munshi could never meet the Nizam alone—not until the fateful afternoon of September 17, 1948, when the two men met at last and, later in the evening, a nervous and broken voice spoke for the first time over the radio to the people of his fallen State and referred to "my friend, Mr. Munshi."

## XIV

## THE FIRST SHOT

EVENTS leading to the happenings of that date moved fast. The first shot had been fired at Nanaj on July 25. It was a signal that the storm was gathering, and an Indian Minister, speaking in Bombay, declared that the tricolour would be flying in six weeks in every village in the State. Then, something unusual happened, an unexpected revolt against the silence imposed by fear and repression. Seven men published a statement condemning the Razakars and favouring accession. They were brave men to have defied danger and they were all Muslims (and therefore not expected to attack a Muslim Government which was also a "good" Government). The statement created a storm; many criticised it and some even questioned its motive. One son stole a march on others by publishing the discovery that his father—one of the signatories—was a Mir Jafar. This astounding claim to distinguished descent paled into insignificance when the Writers' Association put on the wig and, with the great Dictator himself in the chair, pronounced the seven men guilty of high treason.

In other countries people have looked to their writers and intellectuals for leadership in the movement for the freedom of the human mind from enslavement but the writers of Hyderabad preferred to deprive themselves of the heritage of Rousseau and ran, with chains in their hands, to catch the rebel chieftains. People who wondered how the intellect of a great and cultured nation like the Germans could have been suppressed now found a demonstration of the process on a small scale in Hyderabad.

The Government and party both took a serious view of the defiance. There were pensioners among the agitatories and the axe fell on their pensions. It was recommended that they should be stopped for a period and the Government making the recommendation had made the offer of a pl. biscite to decide whether to accede or not. Would pensioners not be allowed to vote or would they be allowed only if they voted against accession? The Nizam urged forgiveness. The Itchad suspected that royal hands were pulling the strings.

The suspicion grew stronger when, against the wishes of the Ministers but with the Prime Minister acquiescing, the Nizam put Sir Mirza into the picture. This veteran had a soft corner in his heart for Hyderabad despite the treatment he had received two years ago and he agreed to go to Delhi and knock at the door. The first response was heartening and Sir Mirza suggested that the Prime Minister should proceed to Delhi. There is a link missing here and whether it was lost in Delhi or in Hyderabad is not known.

It is rumoured that Sir Mirza at first indicated the possibility of accommodation of some of the points of difference by means of the collateral letter provided the draft of the Agreement itself was signed, the Razakars disbanded, the Government changed and responsible government declared as the goal. The Nizam's Ministers appear, however, to have raised technical objections to the unrecognized status of Sir Mirza as an intermediary and the fact that there was no invitation from India to reopen negotiations.

Sir Mirza then wrote another letter to the Nizam and, referring to the hardening of opinion against Hyderabad, advised the adoption of two courses, namely, signing the June drafts without consulting the Ministers and inviting the Indian Army to give protection to the Nizam against his Government and the Razakars. Sir Mirza's letter was brought by Zain Yar Jung and the Nizam consulted his Prime Minister. It could hardly be expected that the latter would agree to the Nizam signing the drafts without the knowledge and concurrence of his Council and it was difficult for the Nizam to assume sole responsibility and face the music alone. Already, his conduct in putting Sir Mirza into the picture and making secret enquiries (from almost everybody) about the loyalty of the armed forces and specially the Police had made him suspect.

Reference was made in a journal, the *Parcham*, to the Nizam's efforts at sabotaging the Ministry by constant telephonic communication with Sir Mirza. With suspicions and feelings running high, the strength of the Razakars in the city, the opposition of the Government and the doubtful attitude of the

Police which, it was said as early as October 28, would not intervene against the Muslims, there was ground for the fear that any independent line by the Nizam in direct opposition to the wishes of his Ministers, the signing of the rejected agreement and the calling of the Indian Army to keep him on his *gadi*, would leave no Nizam to be protected by the time the Indian Army arrived. While there were many who could appreciate the difficulty—almost the impossibility—of the two courses suggested by Sir Mirza, there were some, who suggested that their rejection should be accompanied by positive action to disband the Razakars and change the Government, leaving it to the new Government to reopen negotiations with India and arrive at a settlement with the major political parties.

Such steps were in all reason likely to modify the attitude of India with regard to the points of difference while the disbandment of the Razakars and an internal settlement would have led to general pacification throughout the country. But, while the Nizam called the Razakars a "menace" and wanted to know why, when the Ministers had agreed to disband them progressively, they could not be disbanded at once, he was given to understand and was told repeatedly that, being a product of the conditions which had arisen, they could be disbanded only when the conditions no longer remained. As regards change of Government, the Nizam was assured that what India desired was a mere "reconstitution", with the same Prime Minister and Deputy, the same four stalwarts of the Ittehad and the same four officials so carefully selected by the Ittehad but with the addition of just four members of the State Congress (with a sub-conscious reservation that B. S. Venkat Rao, the Ittehadi Untouchable, the hero guaranteeing the results of the plebiscite, would have to be included in the Congress quota). Even such "reconstitution" was conditional upon a prior settlement with India in the external sphere.

A delightfully vicious circle was thus created, with the Ministers tutoring the Nizam in the metaphysics of what should follow and what should precede. There was no realism in their approach to the grave problems which were now confronting them both outside and within. Having decided in good sense to go ahead with the task of establishing a Constituent Assembly, they announced that the basis would be Muslim-non-Muslim parity (13 and 87 per cent to be given 50 : 50 respectively), thus exposing the intention underlying their demand that the Constituent Assembly should be "on a basis to be determined later and in accordance with the traditions of Hyderabad." When the sheer absurdity of it was pointed out the answer was given that this inequitable feature would be mitigated by recourse to contrivances which, as in the case of the existing Legislative

Assembly, would have the effect of Hindu-Muslim and not Muslim-non-Muslim parity (13 and 85 instead of 87 per cent to be given 50 : 50 respectively). This was as far as adjustment was possible and political insight could permit. And here is a record of an interesting talk at the Palace : "I have told Laik Ali that he and his Government must go as soon as the Constituent Assembly is elected. They have mismanaged and Laik Ali is too weak to influence his party. Don't you think there will be trouble if I dismiss them now? They say it will take months to disband the Razakars forcibly. Do you think I can rely on the Army and the Police in case I decide to change the Government and disband the Razakars? In 1939 I announced Hindu-Muslim parity with joint electorates; now they have made me announce Muslim-non-Muslim parity with something like separate electorates. Who is going to accept it?" Rather dangerous doubts these; they arose daily and daily they were set at rest in a two-hour contest with the Prime Minister. So the announcement stood and orders were given to expedite the Constituent Assembly. Nothing came of Sir Mirza's suggestions, no constructive counter-proposal; only Zain Yar Jung was given his *conge* and, after years of faithful service, even newsboys shouted in the streets that he was a "traitor." He protested against the new title; a public statement of exoneration was promised but never appeared; instead, he was made to enter the Valhalla of traitors along with Sir Mirza and the signatories of the declaration favouring accession. The ceremony of initiation was performed by Kasim Razvi himself, and he uttered the warning that if hands were raised against the State they would be cut down—those hands and the hands controlling them. The last reference was to no less a person than His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar.

Now, undeterred by this threat of cutting down of hands as if they were toddy trees, a young Osmanian, by name Shoiabullah Khan, Editor of a periodical called the *Imroz*, continued to criticise the Razakars and the Ittehad and to ask for integration with India. He was assassinated one night and one of his hands was found cut by a sword. This decapitation was too symbolic for people to swallow the story, to which currency was given deliberately, that there was a woman in the case.

## XV

### FINAL STAGE

AS if this act of liquidation was not sufficient, Hyderabad now entered upon the final stage of its own suicide. The Government of the day, advised—it is believed—by Pakistan, decided to approach the Security Council on the plea that the dispute with India constituted a threat to international peace and security. It was said at the time that Sir Walter Monckton had advised against the course and it is known that the Nizam was himself not inclined to favour it. Not that Hyderabad did not have any case for attracting the notice of the Security Council. There was Hyderabad's theoretical right to prefer "political relations" to accession (though this had been tempered by acceptance of a plebiscite); there was India's refusal to have recourse to arbitration over the breaches, alleged by both sides, of the Standstill Agreement and there was Nanaj (though how it constituted a threat to international peace and security was a little mysterious). Now, supposing for a moment that Hyderabad had won all its contentions under these heads, in what manner could the Security Council intervene? Whether by mediation or otherwise, would it not naturally take as a basis the drafts negotiated in June and limit the proceedings to the points of difference? Would it concede to Hyderabad the rule of 50 : 50 in the Council, of Muslim-non-Muslim parity in the Constituent Assembly, complete freedom in trade, economic and fiscal matters (with external affairs belonging to India) and the right to seek arbitration in matters like defence? Having failed both internally and externally, if the Government had, even at that late stage, chosen to resign, there would still have been time to reach a peaceful and honourable solution. Instead, it decided to go to the Security Council.

In appealing to that body the Nizam's Government may have been carried away by assurances given by Pakistan or by considerations of gaining time or the idea that the approach might lead to mediation. The Ministers may have calculated that if even then Hyderabad failed the extremists in the Ittehad would not be able to accuse the leaders or Ministers of not having tried. Meanwhile, the legal advisers of the Ittehad studied the United Nations Charter and convinced themselves that the Security Council had no right to interfere in internal matters. India was accordingly informed that Hyderabad had decided to appeal to the United Nations.

The move made Indian intervention a certainty and whatever doubts remained were dispelled when the second shot was

fired at Kodar. The Governor-General of India made a last appeal to accept the two courses suggested by Sir Mirza and again they were rejected without the rejection being accompanied by any positive action to remedy the situation. Both the Government and the Razakars continued and the Prime Minister secretly flew to Ziarat for an audience with the Governor-General of Pakistan. The internal defences were strengthened not merely by the mobilisation of the Army but by Yamin Zubairi's exhortation to the public to shoot those suspected of treachery even if the Police or Revenue authorities did not order any such action. On the night of September 10, Moin Nawaz Jung, the leader of Hyderabad's delegation to the Security Council, flew to Karachi en route to Paris. He reached the capital of Pakistan on the morning of the 11th and, on the same night, Quaid-e-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, suddenly passed away. On the 13th, India's Police action against Hyderabad began.

It is possible that even after notice was given of the impending action some may have believed that India was bluffing. Some of the Ministers at least could not be classed in that category and certainly the Prime Minister knew and admitted that Kodar meant business. It is also said that when Moin Nawaz Jung left he took with him his family and all his belongings, leaving no room in the plane for the other Delegate, Rahim, who was left behind. Another special plane is said to have carried away the family and belongings of Syed Taqiuddin. They must surely have foreseen what was coming. The possibility of armed conflict with India had been the subject of constant discussion between the Nizam and his Prime Minister, the Nizam asking what hope there was of any result but defeat and disaster.

The question arises: did these Ministers who, unlike Kasim Razvi who was a blind fanatic and had never seen the world, occupied positions of responsibility and had access to every information, two of them experienced administrators, two of them judges, three of them shrewd business men and investors out of whom one, the Prime Minister, was the most successful business man of all of them, an engineer not unacquainted with administration, a man of the world, widely travelled and known for his balanced views—did they fail to realize the consequences of the policy they were pursuing? Did they think they could stand against the Indian Army or did they wish to offer only a token resistance, registering a sort of protest with a few human lives, or did they believe in a fight to the last man; a whole community choosing to suffer annihilation rather than surrender the State it ruled?

Such self-immolation was in fact preached by Kasim Razvi who advised women to offer themselves to tanks, and it is true

that boys of twelve or fourteen, innocent and brave, young boys, rushed out of their homes and joined the ranks of the fighters, not telling their parents lest they should prevent them from joining. But the leaders kept away, one and all, and the Ministers faced the inexorable march of India's Army over more than a dozen fronts with curious composure. Business went on in the city ; there was no incident of any kind ; there was tension and fear perhaps but also resignation and some, believing in what they had heard, hoped to keep India at bay for months. Propaganda had created the impression even in India that Hyderabad would not be an easy proposition. Had the Ministers in Hyderabad come, by a process of self-delusion, to believe in what they had wanted others to believe ? Propaganda has sometimes that effect specially where, like the quality of mercy, it is not strained, and it is also twice blessed in that it begins to deceive oneself no less than others.

What else was there behind the composure of the Ministers ? Was it the calmness of men facing the inevitable or the assurance of great expectations ? Now, history has recorded with admiration the cool courage of Stafford as he faced his end but Ministers are hardly expected to see their State led up the path of sure destruction and remain calm and unperturbed. Were they merely playing a game of hazard and were the consequences of loss so unpredictable as to warrant such gambling by otherwise careful investors ? Did these Ministers not foresee the forces of hatred that would be unleashed, the vast reactions of defeat, the unsettlement that would follow collapse ? How could they have preferred, with open eyes, the alternative of military resistance, a virtual war and a certain surrender to the alternative of an agreement which, with all its disadvantages would have afforded a peaceful solution and introduced change with gradualness and accommodation ? These men, with all their faults, were not mad or ignorant fanatics to rush into fire unless they were expecting something not of the nature of a miracle to save them. What was it they expected ?

Mir Laik Ali used often to say that while, under the previous regime, Hyderabad could not have resisted India for more than two weeks, his Ministry had built up sufficient resources and sinews to withstand the onslaught of the Indian Army for several months. This preparation meant that a fight was expected. Hyderabad's Army Commander thought at first that he could resist for three months. Some Military Officers spoke of the low morale of the Indian Army and the slow progress in Kashmir ; they ignored the difference in terrain and the two vital factors of Pakistan and opposition from the raiders. Similar unrealism characterised the amateurish attempts to enlist the sympathies of Mr. Truman, Mr. Churchill and the Middle

Eastern countries. The King and Mr. Attlee were also approached. What could they do, especially Mr. Churchill, except still more to antagonise and irritate the Indian mind? Mr. Attlee's letter stated that he had advised India against resort to force, but it also mentioned that he thought the June offer was "honourable" to both parties. This letter was treated as a "moral victory" for Hyderabad and more emphasis was laid on the advice to India than on the clear hint to Hyderabad.

The argument that Britain could not interfere so long as Hyderabad's external affairs were controlled by India was taken to imply the possibility of some sort of intervention after the Star-istill Agreement came to an end. Meanwhile, the Goebbels of Hyderabad spread the whisper that a large army and air force, subsidised by Hyderabad, awaited instructions at Goa or Karachi to attack India the moment India attacked Hyderabad. It is not impossible that such an army or air force was in the making, particularly as occasional references were made to it in talks even at Shah Manzil. Then there was the hope that the United Nations would intervene effectively and call India to order if it disturbed the peace and security of South India, and there was also the belief that the Muslims of India would agitate. Last and most important of all the expectations was the conviction that the new world of Pakistan would redress the balance of the old world of Hyderabad by throwing its weight into the scales. Pakistan's Foreign Minister had declared a little earlier that his country could not remain an idle spectator of the violation of Hyderabad. Was it merely a warning or threat or an earnest of the intention to intervene with men, money and arms? Or did it mean assistance only by words and dialectics in the luxurious forum of the Security Council? In the context of the United Nations, here certainly was a statement calling for "simultaneous interpretation" and Hyderabad took it at its best.

That Mr. Jinnah's advice had been freely sought and given was an open secret. For Pakistan Hyderabad had a certain nuisance value against India and, with war raging in Kashmir, it is conceivable that encouragement was given so that Hyderabad should be firm. But the question of all questions is whether Hyderabad was led to expect military intervention. In 1947, Mr. Jinnah had made it clear that if Hyderabad thought its cause was righteous it should die to a man. He had at the same time advised reasonableness in the negotiations with India and prescribed the speedy development of a more democratic system of government. He had also refused to spare a single gun for Hyderabad. It is rumoured that, at a later stage, he again counselled reasonableness in an open telegram which occasioned the caustic comment of Kasim Razvi that, with Pakistan achieved, the Quaid-e-Azam had lost interest in the fortunes of the Muslims

of India. It is also known that, at one stage at least, the Prime Minister of Pakistan had refused to get involved in commitments as distant as the Polish guarantees. Mr. Gulam Mahomed, Pakistan's Finance Minister and once Finance Member of Hyderabad with a distinctly progressive policy, was known to have advised compromise with India and an internal settlement on the basis of 60 : 40 between the Hindus and Muslims respectively. Pakistan may thus have advised according to her own lights, encouraged according to her own interests, agreed to being used as a base for the supply of arms and equipment, but did she promise military intervention which would involve her in a war with India?

Mir Laik Ali said upon his return from Ziarat that Mr. Jinnah had engaged to open four fronts against India if Hyderabad could withstand the Indian onslaught for fifteen days. To some he indicated three months and the variation serves to throw doubt on the story. It may be that Mr. Jinnah was persuaded to put the matter before his Cabinet and it is said that he specially returned to Karachi to do so. The rumour was circulated at the time that it was at the meeting of the Cabinet convened for this very purpose that Mr. Jinnah took suddenly ill, that the Ministers of Pakistan decided in favour of war but that no action was taken as the declaration required the signature of the Governor-General and the arrival of the new incumbent was awaited. When Khwaja Nazimuddin, the most non-violent of Bengalis and the least bellicose of men, assumed charge of his new office he delivered a broadcast speech in which no mention was made of Hyderabad, but there was an apologetic reference to those with whom Pakistan sympathised but whom she could not help as she had first to help herself. This reiteration of the well-known maxim that charity should begin at home caused disillusionment but not despair as people began to look inwards, to pin their faith on the gallant Army and the brave Razakars and draw consolation from the acknowledgement by the All-India Radio that the Indian Army was meeting with stiff resistance. Propaganda made them believe that several towns which had fallen had been recaptured and that the planes flying over Hyderabad at dead of night were the fighters of the Hyderabad Royal Air Force. That could have been the only explanation of the alert sounding after the planes had flown but, when the B.B.C. mentioned in a news broadcast that Hyderabad's air arm had never once been sighted, even that illusion was dispelled.

## XVI

### THE LAST SPEECH

PAKISTAN now loomed as large but more distant and a new and more sensible meaning was given to Mr. Jinnah's promise, if it was made at all. He had made it conditional that Hyderabad should be able to resist for fifteen days (or three months) and this meant obviously that Pakistan's General Staff did not expect Hyderabad to last as long, and if it did not it was not worth defending. It was a more accurate calculation than Hyderabad's own reckoning, for resistance collapsed in five days and the structure of Hyderabad's defences proved to be a house of cards.

In his broadcast appeal to India two days before the surrender, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad referred to the campaign as a "major war" and Moin Nawaz Jung complained before the Security Council that India was using all the weapons of modern warfare against the State. However one may describe the five days' struggle, was it expected that India would specially equip her Army with bows and arrows or swords and spears out of consideration for Hyderabad?

There is little doubt that military action was expected at one stage or the other, that preparations were made to meet it in full force, that no mere token resistance but an all-out struggle was intended, that there was expectation of widespread Muslim agitation if not revolt in India coupled with the possibility (not the promise) of Pakistan's Cabinet deciding by a majority to intervene if only Hyderabad could resist for a sufficient time to prove its endurance and the capacity to stand on its own legs. It was here that miscalculation of its own strength led Hyderabad into the dual error of choosing the path of resistance and expecting Pakistan to come to its aid. That is why, despite the gradual breaking down of nerves and news of withdrawal from every front, the Ministry attempted till the last to remain in power and maintain the semblance of a fight. The campaign was directed by Mir Laik Ali himself. Some crazy things were said, such as the statement that the State Forces had opened a front and were marching towards Goa. Some equally crazy orders appear to have been given, like the order to attack Bezvada with a band of Razakars.

Towards the end, Mir Laik Ali was a tired man. He appealed to India for a generous gesture but refused to make a gesture himself. In fact, he referred to the certainty of men and women suffering total annihilation with the perimeter of the Indian Army approaching the capital and there is

little doubt that if the Nizam had not intervened the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad would have witnessed the bloodiest scenes in their history. Although there was peace in both the cities, the tension was growing. The Indian Army was within fifty miles and, if the war came closer, there was bound to be bloodshed. The Nizam was anxious to dismiss his Ministers and end the struggle and the Commissioner of Police was anxious, from the point of view of law and order, that the surrender should take place while the armies were still at a fair distance from the capital. The Ministers appear to have been reluctant till the last to leave office or agree to surrender. On September 16, the Army Commander at last informed the Nizam that further resistance would mean unnecessary loss of life and the Nizam demanded that his Ministers should order a cease-fire, disband the Razakars and tender their resignation. If this was not done by the following morning, he intimated, the sole responsibility for the consequences would be theirs.

Up to that day, Mir Laik Ali was hoping that a miracle would happen and the Hyderabad Army would break through the encirclement and destroy its opponents. At Dar-es-salaam there was feverish consultation. Earlier in the week, the Ittehad had seriously considered the possibility of acceding to Pakistan, and there were many sharing this thought. None of these intellectuals stopped to consider whether the proposition would be acceptable to Pakistan or not. In any case, it was now too late. On the morning of the 17th, the Ministers tendered their resignation and, admitting that they were late in doing so, placed the supreme responsibility in His Exalted Highness's hands. By 5 o'clock that afternoon the order for cease-fire was effective throughout the State and the Razakars in Hyderabad and Secunderabad surrendered peacefully to the Police. It was a critical day as information had reached the Police Commissioner that Kasim Razvi had distributed six thousand guns and ammunition to the Razakars with instructions to stage a holocaust or join the Communists; he warned the leader of the consequences by way of reprisals by the Indian Army and induced him to make an appeal to his followers to preserve the peace. That was the last time Kasim Razvi spoke over the Deccan Radio and it was by far the best speech he ever made. Two days later he was placed under arrest and handed over to the Indian Army.

## XVII SURRENDER

ON September 19, while the Commander of Hyderabad's Army was signing the terms of an unconditional surrender, the first detachments of the Indian Army began to arrive. While Hyderabad maintained a sullen calm, crowds gathered in Secunderabad. There were disturbances, looting and arson. At Dakshina Sadan in Bolarum, Mr. Munshi awaited the arrival of India's Army Commander, Major-General J. N. Chaudhri; the mines laid on the Bidar Road delayed it. Meanwhile, Mr. Munshi had another and a different kind of visitor. Released the same day from jail, Swami Ramanand Tirth, the President of the State Congress, was busy consulting Mr. Munshi on the terms of an appeal to his followers to maintain the peace. That night General Chaudhri spoke for the first time over the radio to the people of Hyderabad. He reminded them that the chief object of the Indian Army was to restore law and order and that India was a secular State with an Army which made no distinctions between men of different races and creeds. There was a ring not so much of triumph in that speech as of sincerity and people liked him for what he said.

As India's Army broke through the different fronts it had chosen for attack and made rapid advance towards its destination and objective, disorder broke out in the villages and towns on the route and spread to other areas. Muslim houses were looted and burnt and, in some cases, there was killing of Muslim men and the abduction of Muslim women. One of the chief targets was the policeman, always unpopular, more unpopular here because he was in seven or eight cases out of ten a Muslim with a majority of Hindus to control and at least in four or five cases either a silent spectator or accomplice of the more adventurous Razakars.

In the days of World War II, the remote prospects of a Japanese invasion had induced the Government of the day to issue instructions to all district authorities to maintain law and order and the essentials of the life of the people even by co-operating with the invader, once he took over. The Laik Ali Ministry does not appear to have given any such instructions on the occasion of India's police action, with the result that, in a large number of cases, the Police and Revenue officials left their posts of duty and fled to the capital.

What happened was something which was expected after a great upheaval and it was not just goondaism or the act of

what, for shirking the responsibility of naming the culprits, we are accustomed to call "the anti-social elements." It was a communal outbreak on a wide scale, the demonstration of private and public revenge, and the goondas gave a helping hand and collected as much as they could. It was like a cloud bursting, of pent-up emotion, suppressed hatred, the reaction of the poison preached and practised for the past twenty years, the doctrine of the right of conquest and the gospel of "I am King," its apotheosis in the form of government achieved by Kasim Razvi, the Razakars, the speeches, the fear, the hate, the longing to see the end of things.

It was a justification no doubt of that sense of insecurity which had been exploited since partition for purposes of political power, but it had been so wrongly and ill-exploited as to bring about not security but, instead, sordidly, ungraciously, with all the fanfare of hate and the trumpeting of triumph, the very tragedy which it was intended to avoid. Who expected that the release would be merciful? It came with suddenness and speed, leaving no time for adjustment, and it knocked down all the strongholds, the storey after storey of political and communal interests. Such was the wreckage presented to the gaze of the monster of Frankenstein as he stood amidst the debris and watched the world of his own creation—an ugly world instead of the world which he had inherited, the Hyderabad which we all loved and tried to serve. That is what communalism achieved for us.

## XVIII

### MILITARY GOVERNMENT

THE etiquette of tooth for tooth and nail for nail assumes that there is also parity in retaliation but the man who receives a blow and rises angrily to take revenge can hardly be expected to give only a blow in return. Thus, what the Razakars achieved in a year was achieved, some say even excelled, within a fortnight by their opposite numbers. But it would be wrong to blame the whole of the Hindu community for these misdeeds just as it would be wrong to ascribe to the whole of the Muslim community or even all the Razakars the atrocities perpetrated during the year. In the darkest hour there were Hindus who gave protection to Muslims just as Muslims had given protection to

Hindus. It is to the credit of some workers that they toiled night and day among the Muslim sufferers and gave them confidence and comfort. One lady—she prefers to be called a woman—left the comparative restfulness of Government House at Lucknow and took the risk of arriving a few days before the Police action in order to be of help. She worked among the women of Secunderabad and its suburbs and among those who had fled from their homes and arrived destitute in Hyderabad. Her brother called for an amnesty for the Razakars.

One couple engaged itself in rescuing women from the interior villages and students came forward as volunteers. For those who had suffered were largely, innocent men and women, the real people of the land. Their Hindu brothers and sisters had moved out in thousands to the neighbouring Provinces and it was now their turn. Both had been hunted by the same monster. Where were their leaders? Some of them now began to proclaim that Hindu-Muslim unity was the only solution. It mattered little that the discovery was late; what was important was that their cry of Eureka should be heard. Their followers stood bewildered. Kasim Razvi's bid for power had silenced the more moderate amongst them so that even if he had followed the dictates of wisdom his successor would have been a man of more extreme views. Now, all of them were once more together, levelled to the same depth. Many among them had witnessed, some had spent, nights of political revelry, drinking intoxicating potion, the wine of power and domination, the vintage of 1939; for a whole year they had lived like chronic alcoholics, through extreme action. When at last the storm blew and swept away the gaieties of their table, the book, the loaf of bread and the flask of wine, they found themselves standing on the brink of a dangerous precipice. They were dissipated, disillusioned, demoralised, and they swore they would never drink again. They were determined to abjure politics.

That was the feeling generally of the Muslims after the shock they had received. Two things helped to restore their balance as far as it could be restored, the gradual return to normal life with the Indian Army and the Police taking over control over the districts and the sense of permanency of the change, the sense that it might have been, might yet be, much worse. To both these factors the personality of General Chaudhri contributed as a fitting representative of a secular State. As such, he could please no communalist, whether Hindu or Muslim, but there was, for once, need for holding the scales evenly, with as little intrusion of the military manner as possible. Not that there were no incidents after the Military and the Police took over, but incidents take place under a normal civil government and they now became more and more sporadic, gravitating to the

areas which had been the hot-beds either of communist or of communal activities or where the requirements of law and order had for long been regarded as a function subsidiary to the collection of revenue. Thus, Nalgonda and Warangal, Bidar and the jagir areas of Osmanabad, continued to give trouble. And the first two, with communism making attempts at survival, is going to be the problem also of any interim or popular government which takes over.

It is a fashion in these days to ascribe all violence to the communists but are they alone in their devotion to the cult of fire and sword? There are many in Hyderabad today trained in the use of violence and it is suspected that there has also been some infiltration of the R.S.S. It is of importance no less to India than to the people of Hyderabad that law and order in the State should be restored and maintained.

That is the task with which the Military Government has been charged and it has been rendered difficult by the size of the State, the inadequate means of communication with the interior villages and the collapse of local administration. The restoration of law and order implies the return of a sense of security of life, prosperity and honour and, after restoration, law and order can be maintained only if there is an administrative machinery capable of keeping the peace and meeting the needs of the new situation.

Several questions arise. Is the Military Government only to deal with the problems of law and order and administration and leave to the Constituent Assembly and the popular government even those adjustments to the new situation, in the economic, social and cultural fields, which are required in preparation of the integration to come? Will such waiting not cause frustration, opposition, extremism? Is there no need to make a beginning, to take the first step at least, in the direction of re-building the social order, creating a national mind and consciousness, redressing the economic grievances and secularising the State and its institutions? Are the communists in the two districts of Nalgonda and Warangal to be dealt with only by police or military action? Will they not come back to life the moment such action ceases? Should not a beginning be made in the direction of agrarian reforms? Should not the administration of the Sarf-e-Khas and jagirs be taken over so that their people may no longer be deprived of those standards of administration and the facilities for education, medical relief and public health which their brothers in the rest of the State enjoy? Must the mother tongue medium continue to be ignored even in the secondary stage? These tasks are more of the nature of remedying deficiencies or wrongs; must even these await the advent of the Constituent Assembly?

## XIX THE FUTURE

EVENTS are curious phenomena. They may justify fools, but there is some such thing as being wise after the event. Now, there are parts of India, lying in unobtrusive corners, where maladministration or the weakening of law and order may for some time be tolerated and left to local readjustments without serious consequences. Like Kashmir, however, though for entirely different reasons (Kashmir being situated on India's vital frontier), Hyderabad is far too big a proposition to be left to its own devices. It is far too centrally situated, stretching almost from sea to sea across the centre of the Indian peninsula. That explains the application of British Paramountcy to Hyderabad in 1926 and Indian intervention in 1948.

Disorder in the State must affect the neighbouring areas and maladministration is bound to have its consequences on the conduct of matters of all-India concern. Even in the political or economic sphere, it is hardly conceivable that India would watch with unconcern the creation of an ideologically different State in the Deccan. The paramount concern of India in Hyderabad is, therefore, likely to extend India's interest to spheres wider than those falling strictly within the purview of the Union. It is not altogether impossible that the future may bring conflicts, not merely the constitutional or administrative differences usual in a federation between a unit and the centre, but real conflicts of ideology or methods, the desire to go faster or slower, extremism, parochialism, revivalism. Indian Paramountcy is then bound to come into play in a thousand different ways, gently or harshly, by advice or intervention and history will repeat itself for the benefit of India as a whole.

Personal ambition, power politics and communalism prevented the Ittehad, when it had the chance of its life, from rising to the occasion and achieving real good government and peace both with India and with the people. As a popular party, even though confined to one community, it could have proved better than a government by bureaucrats, representing none. Creature of those communal urges which, in culminating in the partition of India, brought untold misery and suffering to millions, it remained immune to the change of circumstances after partition. Politically, it succeeded in effecting transfer of power, but it only transferred power to itself. It replaced autocracy by dictatorship, oligarchy by fascism. In its

negotiations with India, it carried bargaining to a breaking-point. It filled its own ranks and the ranks of government with incompetent yes-men and subordinated all considerations to the chief objective of power.

If, upon taking over the administration, it had thought less of rule and more of responsibility, less of itself and more at least of the community (if not the country) it professed to serve, the end would not have been the same. It had some able and earnest men but it had no use for them and its political creed made sure that only the more fanatical would rise. Its leaders were too small for the tasks of leadership just as its representatives were not big enough for the responsibilities of government.

But that is all over now, and a great and cultured community, with high traditions of rule and responsibility, has paid dearly for the folly of its leaders. In its fall, despite the cruel blows it has received, its loss of home, of occupation, even of face, it has preserved its dignity. Will it now rise to the needs of the occasion, attune its mind to the new order of things, adjust itself to the new situation and help itself and the country to pull together?

Will its rich and well-to-do (in addition to the Government) help in the task of its rehabilitation, its main problem at the present moment? Will it now, in its moment of supreme trial, be led by wisdom or by counsels of despair? The Muslims of Hyderabad can still make great contributions to the welfare and prosperity of the State and India and the greatest contribution they can make is to join the common stream, to offer the best of their experience and traditions for the rebuilding of a new order.

What prevented right things from being done in the past may easily turn the future into a mere repetition unless the politics of today adjust themselves to the new responsibilities. We have all made mistakes in the past, the Ruler, the Governments, the political parties, the officials (including the ex-officials) and others. In one sense or the other, we have all moved in narrow grooves, thought either selfishly or traditionally or in a communal or sectional fashion. Yet, the world had changed. British withdrawal effected a tremendous revolution in India, with India becoming an international entity and no alien government to rule her fortunes. The creation of Pakistan was another big change. The new India is facing problems, both external and internal, which are difficult enough to try the ability of the greatest statesmen in the world. Thank God she has today men at the helm of affairs who are international and secular in their outlook. A vigilant world is watching, some in not too friendly a spirit, the fortunes of this powerful new-comer

## THE FUTURE

to the society of nations, the natural leader, if she chooses to be, of Asia. Today her chief problem is to integrate her people into a common nationality, transcending race and religion and yet accommodating the cultural heritage of each. We have first to be a nation and public life has to be adjusted to that end. There is bound to be a period of trial and error, but let there be no doubt that the paramount need of the hour is to unite. It is bad enough to have old wine in new bottles but new wine getting into old bottles is far worse and what matters is the intoxication. In the New Year, let us hope that the vintage of 1949 will be lighter and better and let us drink to the health of Hyderabad, the new Hyderabad in integration with the rest of India.

THE END.